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Abstract 
 
Ten years from now Kosovo’s declaration of Independence and the aftermath still constitute an 
important field for academic explorations. Given the renewed interest towards the secessionist 
claims to independence, and the practice of state recognition, recognition of Kosovo remains 
topical, in particular due to the diverse reactions of thirds states. These reactions identify that the 
gap in international law to regulate the recognition allows the political choices to play out in the 
decisions of states whether to recognize a newly emerged state or not.  
Having this in mind, the aim of this thesis is to investigate the argumentations instrumentalized by 
the states recognizing Kosovo. To achieve the goal, the research, first of all, utilizes a set of 
theories and concepts combined under the general theoretical framework of the politics of 
recognition which explains the root causes of the emergence of the politics of recognition i.e. the 
differing reactions to Kosovo’s independence and allows identifying it in the Kosovo case. 
 Subsequently, with the help of the Qualitative Content Analysis, the research identifies the 
emergence of the politics of recognition. Also, it indicates the importance of the Earned 
Sovereignty scheme, in line with considerations for “Regional Peace and Stability” and 
“EU/NATO perspective” in the recognition statements. It holds, that the theory should consider 
and explore further the explanatory power of those themes which were identified in a data-driven 
way. 
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Introduction 
 
On February 17, 2008, Kosovo's Assembly declared the independence of the country by a 
statement, which received contradicting responses from the international community. While some 
states recognized the independence immediately, others took a critical stance objecting to 
recognize Kosovo. Nevertheless, according to a statement released by Kosovo’s Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA), the country has secured 114 recognitions (Kosovo MFA, 2018).  
The diversity of these varying reactions is what Jesica Almqvist (2009) refers to as the 
politics of recognition of Kosovo. The differing reactions of the third states identify the lack of a 
common framework to regulate state recognition in general and the recognition of Kosovo in 
particular. In other words, the decision whether to recognize the newly emerged state or not is left 
to the discretion of the individual states. It follows that in theory the criteria for recognition are 
also decided separately, while, the lack of regulation entails that the rules of state recognition turn 
into legal tools for  the political choices of the recognizing states (Worster, 2009). Consequently, 
in the statements set out for justifying the act of recognition the power of argumentation is used 
instrumentally to justify one's declared or undeclared political interests.  
         Given what was discussed above, the research aims to explore the emergence of the politics 
of recognition by analyzing the varying arguments found in the recognition statements of Kosovo 
presented by the recognizing states.  To be precise, the research question is: 
 Based on the recognition statements, what arguments do the recognizing states use as tools 
for justifying the recognition of Kosovo? 
Overall, for the in-depth investigation of the research area, the thesis relies on the general 
theoretical framework of the politics of recognition, which entails a tandem of several theoretical 
concepts and schemes.  In particular, it combines discussions on the legal perspective on state 
recognition and secession. Moreover, it offers schemes for analyzing the arguments of the 
recognition of Kosovo.  To illustrate, the politics of recognition helps identifying the roots of the 
emergence of the differing reactions to the recognition of Kosovo in International Law.  
Furthermore, it allows identifying the rules for secession analyzing the legal boundaries of the 
principle of “Self-Determination.”  Also, it offers the explanatory power of the “Remedial 
Secession” and “Earned Sovereignty” schemes for explaining the arguments of the recognition of 
Kosovo. Additionally, the given research considers the explanatory power of “Self-determination” 
separate from “Remedial Secession.”  
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The exploration of the research area is vital in light of the renewed attention to the 
secessionist claims of independence. Moreover, given the topicality of the Kosovo case among the 
researchers, it may seem that there is not much left to say. However, this research presents a fresh 
look on the issue of the recognition of Kosovo compared to the previous works, in particular, those 
of Jessica Almqvist (2009) and Bolton and Visoka (2010) in a number of ways: 
1) Presenting a more thorough analysis of the different aspects of the “politics of 
recognition” in the theoretical part.  
2) Expanding the analysis of the data of the recognition statements (up to February 2018) 
3) Applying the method of Qualitative Content Analysis systematically for the analysis of 
the recognition statements with the help of MAXQDA software 
4) Presenting a clear strategy on the data collection and justifying the choice of the 
diplomatic correspondence 
5) Maximizing the chances of exploring the issue more profoundly focusing only on the 
positive reactions of the states  
To continue, it is important to indicate what is beyond the aim of this research. First of all, 
considering that the arguments may serve as instruments for justification and do not necessarily 
present the real motivations of the recognizing states, the research does not maintain that Kosovo's 
recognition depends on these arguments. In other words, the assessment of the sincerity of 
invoking these arguments is beyond the interest of this research. What is more, the thesis does not 
aim to evaluate whether the Kosovo case can or cannot be justified based on international legal 
norms. Also, the thesis does not aim to generalize the findings: it merely aims to sharpen the theory 
of the politics of recognition introducing a fresh perspective with the help of a clearly defined 
methodological approach. Finally, it does not aim to compare the findings with the findings or the 
statements found in the previous works on the same topic.  
For the analysis of the data comprised of recognition statement, the research has considered 
the application of Qualitative Content Analysis (QCA). The method has allowed exploring and 
categorizing the arguments found in the recognition statements on the textual level.  As a result, it 
identified the emergence of the politics of recognition in the Kosovo case. In particular, it indicated 
“Earned Sovereignty,” “Regional Peace and Stability,” “EU/NATO perspective,” “The position of 
other entities” as the main themes of the argumentations utilized as tools for justifying the 
recognition of Kosovo.   
The first chapter of the thesis investigates the area of the politics of recognition starting 
from the analysis of the idea of statehood and the clash of “Constitutive” vs. “Declaratory” debate 
on state recognition in International Law.  Moreover, it presents the evolution of the legal 
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norms on the concept of “Self-Determination.” Furthermore, the first chapter presents the 
general view on secession in International law specifying on the “Remedial Secession” theory. 
Finally, it reviews the “Earned Sovereignty” scheme which was created for Kosovo presenting the 
details of its application. This chapter also presents the relevant details of Kosovo’s path to 
recognition within the discussions on “Remedial Secession” and “Earned Sovereignty.” Finally, 
the discussion on the theory in the first chapter ends with an overview of the recognition of 
Kosovo.  
Furthermore, the second section of the thesis is a detailed overview of the methodological 
perspective of the research. In particular, it discusses issues regarding the qualitative approach to 
research, the specifics of the data and the process of the application of the Qualitative Content 
Analysis to the research. The final chapter of the research presents the general findings as 
identified by the analysis of the recognition statements and the interpretation of the identified 
themes. 
  
 10 
 
 
  1. The Politics of Recognition 
 
The general theoretical framework of the politics of recognition draws attention to the 
question of state recognition as an act governed by factors such as politics and law (Almqvist, 
2009; Bolton & Visoka 2010, Fabry, 2013). In particular, the theory holds that the problem which 
entity and under which circumstances should be recognized, is still unresolved: there is no common 
framework regulating the act of state recognition, which, consequently, is reflected in the reactions 
of third states to secessionist claims of independence. Overall, the politics of recognition is 
conceptualized as “the diversity of these differing and conflicting reactions” (Almqvist 2009, p. 
7). In other words, as Fabry (2013) notes, “acts of recognition are neither formal nor fixed; they 
entail discretionary judgment that includes legal, political, moral, economic, security, and other 
considerations” (p. 166). 
  To understand the scope of the theory of the politics of recognition, it is essential to discuss 
its elements separately. First of all, the politics of recognition reflects on the gaps of the legal 
framework in determining the legitimacy of statehood. Then, it highlights the lack of common 
approach in evaluating the worth of the act of state recognition in the “making” of a state 
(Almqvist, 2009). Moreover, the politics of recognition identifies the complexities of the legal 
perspective on secession in international law. The theory holds that while secession is regulated in 
light of the legal norms on self-determination vs. territorial integrity, the ambiguous interpretations 
of these norms outside the intended context are still problematic and misused by secessionists. 
Finally, the politics of recognition relies on the explanatory power of “Remedial Secession” and 
“Earned Sovereignty” as explaining the arguments of the recognition of Kosovo. Also, this 
research relies on “self-determination” and “accepted legal practices” separately to explain some 
of the arguments put forward by those some states recognizing Kosovo. 
  Overall, the thorough analysis of each of these elements in the following sections will allow 
better understanding the emergence of the politics of recognition. Above all, the theoretical 
framework will set the ground for the systematic analysis of the arguments found in the recognition 
statements of Kosovo. The schemes “Accepted Legal Practices,” “Self-Determination,” “Remedial 
Secession,” “Earned Sovereignty” will serve as the starting point for looking at the data and 
analyzing the findings against the theory. That said, the arguments left uncovered by these schemes 
will complement the attempt to identify the emergence of the politics of recognition, i. e. the more 
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different and contradicting the reactions the more evident the emergence of the politics of 
recognition.  
 
1.1. State recognition in International Law 
 
 
Traditionally, the research of secession and the recognition of states as a foreign policy issue 
has been dominated by scholars of international law (Ker-Lindsay, 2017). Moreover, the 
scholarship on this subject has mainly focused on the nature and effects of state recognition (Fabry, 
2013). It follows that the discussion on the theories of state recognition in international law is 
central to the theoretical framework of the politics of recognition. First of all, it is vital for pointing 
out the gaps that allow the emergence of the politics of recognition. Second, it is crucial for the 
evaluation and the critical interpretation of the findings based on the analysis of the recognition 
statements. Thus, to grasp the problem at its core, in this chapter the discussion on the criteria of 
statehood will be followed by the discussions on the constitutive and declaratory debates of state 
recognition.  
 
 
1.1.1. Defining statehood  
 
The link between state recognition and the criteria of statehood is so strong that even 
publicists and states do not always make a distinction between the requirements of the criteria for 
statehood and those for state recognition (Talmon, 2005, p. 109). It follows that the discussion on 
state recognition should start with a discussion on what constitutes a state. 
In fact, there is no universally accepted legal definition of statehood. Moreover, the existing 
varying definitions are considered flawed and dissatisfactory. Nevertheless, the basis of the 
varying definitions of statehood is found in the 1933 “Montevideo Convention on Rights and 
Duties of a state” which outlines the main characteristics of states. According to Ryngaert and 
Sobrie (2011), the Montevideo criteria constitute “the first normative pillar on which state practice 
has rested for the past few decennia” (p. 473). Additionally, Ker-Lindsay (2011) indicates that the 
Montevideo Convention presents significant guidance on the key features of statehood but “non-
binding – framework” (p. 2) for recognition. Likewise, Grant (1999) agrees that the Montevideo 
Convention provides “easily employed standards” (p. 6) of statehood. However, he doubts whether 
these criteria provide a satisfactory definition of statehood or not.   
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 According to the Article 1 of the Montevideo convention (1933), the state as a person of 
international law should retain the following qualifications: 1) permanent population, 2) a defined 
territory, 3) government, 4) capacity to enter into relations with the other states (ILSA, 2018). 
However, as already discussed, these criteria are deemed dissatisfactory, and some authors offer 
additional criteria of statehood. To illustrate, Crawford (1977) introduces independence as “the 
central criterion of statehood” (p. 119) and sovereignty as “an incident or consequence of 
statehood” (p. 139). Moreover, he discusses 1) permanence, 2) willingness and ability to observe 
international law, 3) a certain degree of civilization, 4) legal order,5) recognition, as secondary 
criteria for statehood (Ibid, pp. 140-143). Meanwhile, Grant (1999) discusses four additional 
criteria of statehood: “self-determination,” “democracy,” “minority rights,” and “constitutional 
legitimacy” (p. 84).  
Nonetheless, both the Montevideo criteria and the additional criteria are considered 
problematic. For example, Worster (2009, p. 159) argues that the lack of unified approach 
delegitimizes these criteria because they are applied selectively, which, again, leaves a room for 
political considerations. Grant (1999) contends that the additional criteria make recognition 
“readily deferrable and thus all the more prone to political manipulation” (p. 83). Finally, Worster 
(2009, p. 158) claims that the establishment of legally binding criteria, as opposed to politically 
judged factors, is not widely supported in practice.   
Overall, the gap regarding the definition of statehood is evident. Moreover, this gap allows 
politically judged factors to play an important role while deciding on the criteria of statehood.  
 
 
1.1.2.  The Constitutive debate 
 
While the discussion on statehood identified the lack of unified definition of statehood, the 
discussion on the Constitutive and Declaratory theories indicate the lack of unified approach 
regarding the value of recognition in the making of a state.  The Constitutive vs. Declaratory 
theories present the modern view on the topic of recognition. These theories give different answers 
to the question whether a state becomes a state by recognition, or “because it meets all the 
international legal criteria for statehood” (Talmon, 2005, p. 101).  The theories represent two 
fundamentally different and irreconcilable views of international law (Worster, 2009, p. 119).  
Different scholars, such as Hersch Lauterpracht, Jochen Frowein (Talmon 2005), John 
Dugard (Worster, 2009) have attempted to solve the problems found in both theories offering 
different approaches aimed at reconciliation. However, their attempts have been subjected to 
failure. Nevertheless, the importance of state recognition is apparent. Recognition is an essential 
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condition for the new state to exercise the international rights efficiently and as a member of the 
international community (Jessica Almqvist, 2009) 
The constitutive theory of recognition entails that the recognition of statehood is a 
prerequisite for a state to become “an international legal person” (Murphy & Stancescu, 2017, p. 
10). In other words, it asserts that the existence of a state is not automatic and depends on the 
consent of other states (Worster, 2009, p. 120). Most of the adherents of the constitutive approach 
are positivist in outlook (Crawford, 2006). 
Nonetheless, this theory has its weaknesses.  To start with, James Crawford (2006) 
identifies the “theoretical impossibility” (p. 21) and the actual practice of “illegal recognition” as 
the main problems created by the constitutive principle. Moreover, Talmon (2005, p. 102) 
indicates that the Constitutive principle leads to the relativity of the state as a subject of 
international law, thus failing to explain the responsibility of non-recognized states under 
international law. Also, Worster (2009) argues that this principle allows states to ignore facts, i.e., 
“the existence of a state” (p. 120). Also, he raises an important ethical question whether “existing 
states should be the gatekeepers to the international plane,” (Ibid, p. 102) stating that it questions 
the principle of the sovereign equality of states. 
Thus, the constitutive theory in itself has some serious weaknesses that prevent it from 
offering a unified framework for state recognition. The declaratory theory somehow addresses 
these weaknesses. 
 
1.1.3. The Declaratory debate 
 
The Declaratory theory has emerged as a direct response to the Constitutive principle. 
Talmon (2005) traces the roots of this theory to the natural law view of international law, according 
to which international law is an “objective legal order based on a nature-like community of States” 
(p. 106). This theory entails that a state does not need the consent of others to obtain international 
legal personality: the recognition of a state signifies the acceptance of the facts on the ground. To 
illustrate, Crawford (2006, p. 4) identifies one of the main arguments of the declaratory theory 
according, as long as the existence of a state is apparent; the international law must consider the 
situation on the ground, despite its illegality. This theory prioritizes effectiveness over legitimacy.  
The proponents of the Declaratory theory believe that the recognition of new states is a 
political act independent of the existence of the new state as a full subject of international law 
(Crawford 1977, p. 103). The theory suggests that recognition should be automatic based on 
specified criteria as it believes that the status of the statehood is grounded on fact, not on individual 
state discretion. Moreover, it contends that “the international legal personality of a state and its 
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concomitant rights and obligations solely depend on it being able to satisfy the criteria for 
statehood” (Talmon, 2005, p. 106). Thus, the Declaratory theory sees the nature of the state as 
independent of legal characteristics which limit the power of the already existing states in the 
process of the state-creation.  
Meanwhile, like the Constitutive theory, the Declaratory theory has also been subjected to 
criticism. Worster (2009, pp. 119-121) presents some arguments which highlight the weaknesses 
of this theory, first of all, claiming that state practice does not support it. Secondly, he claims that 
in practice, states may not acquire international rights unless they are recognized. Furthermore, he 
states that the declaratory theory may weaken the belief that international law is the law made by 
states. In addition to this, the overall problems of the criterion of statehood can directly be linked 
to the declaratory theory.  
Thus, the Declaratory theory starts where the Constitutive theory fails to provide answers. 
However, due to the significant problems identified by the critics, it has also failed to gain 
universal acceptance. 
 
 
1.1.4.  The Declaratory and Constitutive theories in practice  
 
Different authors claim that the vast majority of contemporary scholars favor the declaratory 
theory (Talmon, 2005, p. 105; Crawford, 2006, p.  25; Almqvist, 2009, p. 5; Worster, 2009, p. 
119).  As for the practice of state recognition, there are different views in the literature regarding 
which one of the theories prevails. Nevertheless, Worster (2009) claims that the practical evidence 
is not satisfactory to claim that one or the other prevails.  Meanwhile, he also acknowledges that 
while the declaratory theory is at the basis of some practices, the practice of “states blocking the 
emergence of secessionary states” may evidence the constitutive theory (Ibid, 2009, p. 133). 
 An example of the application of constitutive theory is the case of Yugoslavia whose legal 
personality continued to be regarded as existing while it was enduring the process of its dissolution 
(Worster, 2009, p. 134).  In addition to state practice, international tribunals also may support the 
constitutive theory. For example, the support for the constitutive theory was evident in the Celebici 
case, when the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia   concluded that only 
after the international recognition of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina the conflict within the 
former Yugoslavia (FYR) had attained an international nature (Worster 2009, p. 135). As for the 
declaratory theory, Worster (2009, p. 117) gives the example of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) which held that the inability to maintain adequate control during the process of dissolution 
of a state does not extinguish the legal entity as per the U.N. 
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To sum up, the inquiry into the topic of state recognition has illustrated that there is no 
universally accepted definition of statehood. Similarly, there is no unified position when it comes 
to assessing the value of recognition in the “making” of a state. There is always law vs. politics 
positions which are in a constant clash with each other.  Moreover, the discussion indicated that  
the irreconcilable nature of “Declaratory” and “Constitutive”  theories of state recognition marks  
the source of the emergence of the politics of recognition or as stated by (Worster, 2009 “the rules 
of state recognition, although legal rules are legal vehicles for political choices” (p. 116).  Finally, 
it is also problematic to identify which one of the theories prevail in practice. 
 
 
1.2. Self-Determination 
 
The link between state recognition and the idea of self-determination is evident as both are 
considered to be “the two flip sides of the same coin” (Fabry, 2012, p. 663). The content of self-
determination has been continuously evolving which is marked either by the adoption of new 
terminology or by the changes of definition (Hannum, 1993, p.66). Overall, the research identifies 
three main stages of the evolution: a) Wilsonian phase, b) decolonization phase, c) the post-
colonial phase. Each of these periods signifies unique challenges and debates regarding the 
definition and the scope of the application of the principle of self-determination.  
 
 
 
1.2.1. The Wilsonian idea of Self-determination 
 
While some scholars trace the roots of the principle of self-determination from the ideas of 
French Revolution to the Marxist precepts of class liberation, the principle gained global 
significance and value only after the WWI (Borgen, 2009). At this stage, Woodrow Wilson turned 
self-determination into a guiding principle, when “at stake was the management of the remnants 
of the collapsed Austro Hungarian and Ottoman Empires” (Graham, 2000, p. 457). However, the 
problem was that the term was not defined clearly. Woodrow Wilson prescribed plebiscite as a 
solution to decide which national claims to statehood should be recognized. However,  this failed 
because of “the irreconcilable territorial claims in Central and Eastern Europe after WWI […] the 
fact that it regarded the identity question as self-evident” (Mayall, 1999, p. 477). Moreover, Hurst 
Hannum (1994, p. 68) argues that the Wilsonian self-determination was explicitly political, 
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claiming that neither Wilson nor the other Allied forces believed that the principle was absolute or 
universal.  
Overall, at this stage self-determination did not entail the universal right to external self-
determination for ethnic and national minorities, which is portrayed by the outcome of the Aaland 
Islands case. While the population of the Aaland Islands demanded self-determination with the 
aim for annexation to Sweden, the League of Nations rejected this request asserting Finland’s 
sovereignty over the territory. The specially appointed International Commission of Jurists 
concluded that International Law does not recognize the right of external self-determination for 
national groups “by the simple expression of a wish” (as cited by Nanda 1981, p. 266) as it does 
not recognizes the right of separation of other states.  
 
 
1.2.2. Self-determination in the decolonization context 
 
1945 Charter of the United Nations: While at the Wilsonian phase self-determination was a vague 
concept, the post-World War 2 period signifies a new phase for the development of the concept 
into a more specific principle. Hannum (1994) argues that initially, the United Nations (UN) was 
reluctant to recognize self-determination as a fundamental right as it was seen in light of Hitler’s 
attempt to instrumentalize the concept “for reunifying the German nation” (p.11). Notably, the 
principle of self-determination found its place in the 1945 Charter of the United Nations. The 
principle of self-determination of peoples is presented in the context of developing “friendly 
relations among nations” (U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2), and the principle of “equal rights” (U.N. 
Charter art. 55).  
 Borgen (2009) argues that unlike “Wilsonian Fourteen Points” which highlighted the ideal 
of self-determination, the UN Charter initiated the transformation of the concept into “something 
more than mere political rhetoric,” (p. 7) however, again, failing to provide a comprehensive 
definition. Overall, the Charter did not entail the right of secession to national minorities, neither 
did it guarantee any right of external self-determination for colonial peoples. 
 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (1960): While 
self-determination had not affirmed its place in international law at the initial stage of the 
functioning of the UN, it did so later in the decolonization phase. The primary legal document 
which marks the transformation of self-determination from principle into right in International law 
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is the “Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples” adopted 
by the General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. It entails that: 
 
"All peoples have the right to self-determination; by that right, they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development"(UN: retrieved February 
23, 2018)” (United Nations GA, 1960) 
 
With the given statement the General Assembly explained that self-determination was a 
process of decolonization that could result in “secession of a territory to form a new state, an 
association of territory with an existing state, or integration of a territory into an already existing 
state” (Castelinno, 2008, p. 515). Nonetheless, the historical context of the 1960 Declaration is 
vital for its interpretation: “the genesis and object of the Declaration, the specific issues it 
addressed, and its timing are all crucial considerations,” which indicates the limits of the 
application of the term Self-Determination to the colonial people (Nanda, 1981, p. 275).  
The title of the Declaration itself limits the concept of self-determination to decolonization. 
Moreover, the “Salt-Water Thesis” which accompanies the resolution sets the limits of this 
principle ad hoc.  The “Salt-Water Thesis” entails that “only territories separated by water or that 
were geographically separate from the colonizing power could invoke self-determination” 
(Corntassel, 2008, p. 108). The importance of the document can be traced in reference to the 
Declaration in the ICJ’s advisory opinion on the Western Sahara Case (1975). In its advisory 
opinion, the ICJ proclaimed that the right to self-determination of the West Saharans weighed 
heavier than Morocco’s claims to territorial integrity (as cited by Hannum, 1994, p.  271).  
Thus, the careful reading of the 1960 Declaration demonstrates that it foresaw the right to 
external self-determination for colonies; there was no reference to other national or ethnic 
minorities.  
 
Covenants: ICCPR, ICESCR: Other documents highlighting the concept of self-determination 
are, the “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” and “the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” both adopted for signature by the UNGA on 16 December 
1966 through resolution 2200A (XXI). These documents are considered to be the cornerstone 
treaties of international human rights and mark a crucial point for the development of the principle 
of self-determination to a recognized right in international law, emphasizing it in light of general 
human rights (Borgen, 2009, p. 7). Hannum (1994) suggests that the covenants present “the most 
definitive legally binding statement of the contemporary right of self-determination” (p. 18). 
The common Article 1 of the ICCPR and the ICESCR (1966) reads as follows:  
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“All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right, they freely determine their 
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development […] the States 
Parties to the present Covenant […] shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination 
and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations” 
. 
 
Here, again, the problem of defining “people” is evident. Hannum (1994) claims that the 
“reference to “all” peoples and the fact that the article is found in human rights treaties intended 
to have universal applicability, suggest a scope beyond that of decolonization” (p. 19) however, 
emphasizing that it still, should be interpreted in line with the rights of recognized states.  
It can be concluded that while the ICCPR and the ICESCR (1966) link the concept of self-
determination to human rights, they do not grant a right of self-determination to national 
minorities. That right is reserved for colonies or the people of a sovereign State as a whole. 
 
 
1.2.3. Self Determination vs. Territorial Integrity  
 
 Uti possidetis juris and terra nullius: The discussion on self-determination indicates that the 
principle is in a constant clash with the principle of territorial integrity.  While Vidmar (2015) 
argues that none of these principles is absolute Wolf and Rodt (2013) state that states have 
traditionally prioritized the principle of territorial integrity. Likewise, Berg (2009) argues that the 
factor of territoriality has been of more importance than that of self-determination. Meanwhile, he 
notes: “since the second half of the twentieth century, however, normative standards have 
changed” (Berg, 2009, p. 221).  
In international law, the doctrine of uti possidetis juris in line with the norm of terra nullius 
makes up the basis of the contemporary understanding of the principle of territorial integrity. The 
doctrine of uti possidetis juris guarantees the rights of existing stakeholders to the land and 
translates as “as you possess, so you possess” (Castelinno, 2008, p. 508). As for terra nullius, 
unlike uti possidetis juris, it has limited contemporary significance. The term initially was denoting 
territory that was empty and therefore free for colonization it gradually took on “racist overtones” 
(Castelinno, 2008, p. 510).   
 
Friendly Relations Declaration (FRD): The self-determination vs. territorial integrity clash is 
visible in another important legal document which is the  1970 Declaration on Principles of 
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International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations. This document is famous as the Friendly Relations 
Declaration  (FRD), adopted by the General Assembly 2625 (XXV) resolution on 24 October 
1970. Among other things, the FRD emphasizes the importance of the principle of equal rights 
and self-determination for the international law.  In particular, the text condemns the use of 
“forcible action which deprives peoples referred to in the elaboration of the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence” 
(United Nations GA, 1970). Here also, the declaration does not suggest a right to external self-
determination to ethnic or national minorities. Hannum (1994) claims that this declaration “places 
the goal of territorial integrity or political unity as a principle superior to that of self-
determination,” (p. 16) thus excluding the right to external self-determination. It reads as follows: 
 
“Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging 
any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political 
unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle 
of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a 
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, 
creed or colour” (United Nations GA, 1970). 
 
Thus, while the FRD (1970) indicates that the principle of territorial integrity prevails over 
the principle of self-determination, however, the careful reading of the article opens a room for 
further interpretations beyond the limits of territorial integrity (Koroma, 2010). Vidmar (2015) 
considers that it does not qualify secession as illegal or prohibited and presents it to be offering a 
“process of overcoming a competing claim to territorial integrity” (p. 367). Overall, this statement 
infers a link between the right to internal self-determination and the right to external self-
determination through remedial secession, a topic, which will be discussed thoroughly in the in 
the discussion on “Remedial Secession.”  
 
Helsinki Final Act: The Helsinki Final Act was adopted in 1975 by the Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, with the participation of the European States, the United States and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. It is a regional agreement “which represents a significant 
understanding between the Western and Soviet blocs on a variety of issues” (Hannum 1993, p. 
28). Among other things, it included the contemporary view of the participant states on self-
determination conceptualizing it by the principles of the UN Charter and other international legal 
norms such as territorial integrity. Principle VIII of the Final Act states:  
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“By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples 
always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when moreover, as they wish, their internal 
and external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their 
political, economic, social and cultural development” (OSCE, 1975). 
 
 According to Hannum (1993), “the Helsinki language” is seen as “more expansive” than 
that of the previous legal documents referring to self-determination” (p. 29). Yet, this formulation 
does not infer an external right to self-determination to national minorities. As Hannum (1993) 
claims it should be read in light of the “principles of the inviolability of frontiers (principle Ill) and 
the territorial integrity of states (principle IV) also proclaimed in the Helsinki Final Act” (p. 29). 
 
All in all, the evolution of self-determination from a vague principle into a recognized right 
in international law has been evident. While at Wilsonian phase self-determination was just a 
political device intertwined with unrealistic and empty implications to universality, at the post-
WWII period it has attained legal character which has been recorded by some UN documents. 
Furthermore, while the decolonization phase of the evolution of the concept entailed external self-
determination of non-self-governing territories (colonies), later it has envisioned a right of internal 
self-determination for all peoples, to perhaps allowing (debatably) for the possibility of secession 
as a remedy of last resort. Thus, from the legal perspective, self-determination cannot be identified 
as the best tool for justifying the recognition of a non-colonial secessionist entity. 
 
 
1.3.Remedial Secession 
 
1.3.1. The traditional view on secession 
Before discussing the accepted view on secession, it is essential to delineate which act 
constitutes secession. Coppieters and Sakwa (2003) define secession as “the withdrawal from a 
state or society through the constitution of a new sovereign and independent state,” consequently, 
the right to secession is seen as “the right to constitute a new independent statehood” (p. 4). 
Buchanan (2004, p. 332) clarifies that the  right to secede not only implies the right to attempt to 
establish its legitimate state but also obliges others, including the state in which the group is located 
to not interfere with the attempt. Moreover, he sees secession as “the most dramatic form assertions 
of self-determination can take” (Ibid, p. 332).  
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Furthermore, it is crucial to differentiate unilateral act of secession from constitutional or 
consensual secession. As for unilateral secession, within the circles of international legal scholars 
the opinion is that  there is no international legal right to secede except in 2 specific circumstances: 
a) classic decolonization, b) “(perhaps) the reclaiming of state territory that is subject to unjust 
military occupation” (Buchanan, 2004, p. 333). As for consensual or constitutional secession, the 
International law does not prohibit it, moreover, “consensual right to secede is generated by 
process of negotiation or exercised in accordance with constitutional processes” (Ibid, p. 338).  
Furthermore, the international society has traditionally disapproved of secession, and the 
legal documents on self-determination have reflected this.  While legal rules do not regulate the 
act of secession, this does not imply that secession is a legal act. The rules of self-determination 
and territorial integrity set the legal boundaries of secession. In other words “instruments regarding 
self-determination typically contain self-determination within the framework of the territorial 
integrity of states” (Summers, 2010, p.  21).  
Thus replicating the discussion on the FRD (1970), it can be said that the inverted reading 
of the final paragraph, i.e., the “safeguard clause,” (see: Section 1.2.3. ) implies the possibility of 
unilateral secession under very strict conditions. The logic behind the inverted reading of the clause 
states: what if states do not comply with the norms outlined in the safeguard clause? Does it allow 
a “hope” for secession?  Overall, while this document opened a room to discuss the options of 
Remedial Secession”, Vidmar (2010) argues that no judicial body has accepted secession as an 
entitlement in any particular case. However, he  notes that the Supreme Court of Canada “seems 
to have upheld” the inverted reading of the safeguard clause in the Quebec case, which reads as 
such: “the other clear case where a right to external self-determination accrues [apart from colonial 
situations] is where a people is subject to alien subjugation, domination or exploitation outside a 
colonial context” (as cited by Vidmar, 2010, p. 39). Also, not everyone agrees with similar 
interpretation: as Professor Malcolm Shaw states, the theory based on an inverted reading of the 
safeguard clause is subject to debate (Vidmar, 2010). Nevertheless, Remedial Secession has been 
thoroughly discussed by theorists, who highlight the necessity to regulate secessionist claims to 
independence by the remedial scheme 
 
1.3.2. Theory of Remedial secession 
 
As the previous section has illustrated, there is a significant gap in international law, when it 
comes to addressing secession. Thus, the scholars theorizing secession have attempted to address 
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this gap. While the works of theorists are not considered a primary source of international law, 
they influence the judicial and state decisions as a subsidiary source.  
To start with, Bolton and McGriven (2010) identify three distinct currents theorizing secession: 
1) Choice or plebiscitary approach- accepts secession as legitimate by virtue of democracy  
2)  Ascriptivist approach- constructs secession as a legal extension of the right to national 
self-determination 
3) Remedial approach- suggests that secession is legitimate as a remedy for human rights 
abuses and a denial of self-determination  
The remedial approach was initially formulated “as the negative duty to apply collective 
non-recognition to states created in violation of the jus cogens principles of crimes against 
humanity (including ethnic cleansing) or territorial aggrandizement by use of force” (Bolton & 
Visoka, 2010, p. 2). Moreover, this theory relies on the idea of “just cause,” which regards the use 
of force as a legitimate means in particular cases makes up the basis of remedial secession. 
Following the logic of “just cause,” the theorists of remedial secession hold that some conditions 
should be met to build up a case for secession refusing to recognize the absolute right to self-
determination (Coppieters & Sakwa, 2003, p. 19). For example, Allen Buchanan (2004) argues for 
a justice-based conception of legitimacy which entails, “only states that meet or exceed a minimal 
justice standard with respect to their internal and internal actions have a valid claim to their 
territory” (p. 372). He suggests that international law should 1) recognize a remedial right to secede 
but not a general right of self-determination; 2) encourage alternatives to secession (Buchanan, 
2004, p. 331).  
Buchanan (2004) offers that the best way international law can respond to secession is to 
“recognize a right to secede understood as the right of a group to throw off the state’s authority 
[given the respective grievances] and attempt to constitute an entity that will be recognized as a 
legitimate state” (Buchanan, 2004, 335). Here the right to secede is understood in a weaker way.  
Whether the international community should, also, recognize the new entity as a legitimate state, 
should depend upon whether the group provides credible commitments to satisfying the 
appropriate normative criteria for recognition of new entities as legitimate states (Ibid). Moreover, 
secession is understood as a remedy of last resort, which entails that other options of internal-self-
determination should be considered before turning to secession.  
Buchanan (2004, p. 353) identifies the types of injustices as being sufficient to generate a 
(unilateral) right to secede: 
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1)Large-scale and persistent violations of basic individual human rights,  
2)The unjust taking of a legitimate state’s territory 
3)Serious and persistent violations of intrastate autonomy agreements by the state 
 Bolton and Visoka (2010) recommend that it is more useful to analyze Buchanan’s criteria 
of remedial secession according to a reformulation of the just war principles. As a result they offer 
3 additional conditions that “facilitate (or block) remedial secession;”(1) international intervention 
to mediate a status outcome; (2) support of powerful countries; (3) exhaustion of negotiations; g) 
a commitment from the seceding entity to uphold minority rights”(Bolton & Visoka, 2010,  p. 3).  
  Overall, the Remedial theory places a significant constraint on unilateral secession, also 
considering the problem of territorial integrity.  
 
1.3.3. Remedial secession in state practice 
 
When it comes to assessing the usage of the remedial right to secession in practice, there 
are contradicting views regarding whether state practice supports it or not. The contradictions 
mainly arise due to different interpretations of the circumstances of recognition. However, as 
Summers (2010) suggests, “the possibility of remedial secession is often referred to, even if there 
appears little will to apply it” (p. 30).  
All in all, the research on state practice of recognition illustrates that a successful secession 
usually requires the recognition of the parent state. For example, Ker-Lindsay (2013) claims that 
the independence of Eritrea and East Timor succeeded because they were granted recognition from 
parent state. Meanwhile, he also notes that both Eritrea and East Timor had been separate colonies 
before becoming part of Ethiopia and Indonesia, respectively, which infers the colonial right to 
external self-determination and somehow disqualifies these cases as those of unilateral or 
contested secession. Furthermore, after seceding from Pakistan in 1971, Bangladesh gained 
universal recognition only after Pakistan granted recognition (Vidmar, 2010, p. 43). The creation 
of Bangladesh would, therefore, according to Vidmar (2010), not be a clear precedent in support 
of the remedial secession theory. 
Finally, two of the most important events which actualized the issues of secessions was the 
breakdown of the USSR and the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(SFRY) in 1991. When it comes to the former, while there are debates regarding the different 
interpretations of the legal status of these states, the proclamations of independence by the 3 Baltic 
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States is less controversial (Vidmar, 2010). Nevertheless, the dissolution of the Soviet Union is 
considered a “consensual act supported by all republics, including Russia,” implying that it does 
not qualify as a matter of remedial secession, as there was no secession in question (Vidmar, 2010, 
p. 45). 
 
1.3.4. Remedial Secession and Kosovo 
 
Considering that this research aims to illustrate the politics of recognition through the case 
of Kosovo, it is necessary to briefly discuss the elements of Remedial Secession found in this 
particular case. According to Bolton and Visoka (2010) in the Kosovo case, the conditions of 
remedial secession can be identified between the period 1989 and 1999.  
To start with “serious and persistent violations of intrastate autonomy agreements by the 
state” which is identified by Buchanan (2004) as one of the primary conditions of remedial 
secession is seen here.  Kosovo enjoyed autonomy within the framework of the Republic of Serbia 
established in the 1974 constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). 
However, the autonomy was suspended in 1989 which was followed by the Kosovo Albanians 
requesting the creation of the Republic of Kosovo within the SFRY (Vidmar, 2010). However, 
after the dissolution of the SFRY Albanians started to demand independence for Kosovo which 
was followed by an unofficial referendum at which independence was supported by the majority 
of Kosovo Albanians. The unofficial assembly of Kosovo Albanians declared independence of the 
Republic of Kosovo on September 22, 1991, which was ignored by the Badinter Commission and 
gained recognition only by Albania (Vidmar, 2010, p. 47).  
As for the second condition for remedial secession, which is the “large-scale and persistent 
violations of basic individual human rights,” it is also visible in the case of Kosovo. According to 
Bolton and Visoka (2010) following the abolition of Kosovo’s autonomy, some discriminatory 
laws were introduced against the Albanians in Kosovo (such as laws prohibiting the unauthorized 
sale of private property and restricted Albanian-language education), (Bolton & Visoka, 2010, p. 
8). However, the violence escalated in 1977 when Kosovo entered the stage of the humanitarian 
crisis. Given this, the UN Security Council adopted three resolutions in 1998, calling for an 
enhanced status for Kosovo.  Moreover, The Rambouillet Accords was drafted in February 1998 
provided for wide powers of self-government for Kosovo, respecting the territorial integrity of the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) for three years before a referendum on status. While 
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representatives of the Kosovo-Albanians signed the Accords, the FRY and Serbia refused to sign. 
This prompted the NATO-led military campaign against the FRY on 24 March 1999 (Bolton & 
Visoka, 2010). The following period of international supervision of Kosovo up until the 
declaration of independence will be discussed in line with the “Earned Sovereignty” approach. 
All in all, while Remedial Secession, as a remedy of last resort, has received some support 
among writers, the foundations of the doctrine remain controversial both in theory and in practice. 
The question remains whether the inverted reading of the provision on territorial integrity within 
the “safeguard” clause allows secession or not. However, given that the conditions outlined in the 
Remedial Secession are present in Kosovo’s history the scheme offers solid ground for basing the 
justifications of the recognition.  
 
1.4.Earned sovereignty 
 
The doctrine of Earned sovereignty is a relatively new concept in contemporary state 
practice and in conflict resolution which requires the conditional and progressive devolution of 
sovereign powers from a state to a sub-state entity under international supervision. This process is 
directed by the international community which recognizes independence only if the new state 
complies with democratic norms (Bolton & Visoka, 2010, p. 18). In other words, the establishment 
of a “liberal democratic regime” is essential for earning sovereignty (Berg & Mölder, 2012, p 528).  
In fact, the idea of legitimacy is one of the key features of earned sovereignty. Overall, legitimate 
liberal-democratic societies entail three main criteria “(1) democratic procedures (2) the existence 
of a demos with a shared identity and (3) performance, understood as satisfaction with both the 
ends and outcomes of governance” (Berg & Mölder, 2012, 529). Earned sovereignty relies on the 
liberal peace framework, which combines “democracy, free markets, development and the rule of 
in the context of a pluralist and multi-ethnic state-building endeavor” (Franks & Richmond, 2008, 
p. 83), normally run by the UN or by a combination of international actors. This framework aims 
to create “a self-sustaining peace within domestic, regional and international frameworks of liberal 
governance” ((Franks & Richmond, 2008, p. 83). 
While it is beyond the interest of this research to evaluate the implementation of liberal 
peace framework in the general frame of earned sovereignty, it is essential to discuss the elements 
of earned sovereignty briefly and to trace them in the case of Kosovo. 
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1.4.1. The Elements of Earned Sovereignty 
 
The earned sovereignty scheme attempts to solve the territorial integrity vs. self-
determination dichotomy with the help of “a multistage approach” (Grazier and Williams 2016, p. 
6). Each of these stages makes up the elements of earned sovereignty. Overall, earned sovereignty 
consists of three core elements and three optional elements. 
 
The Core Elements of Earned Sovereignty: 
 Shared sovereignty: The sub-state entity and the host state (or the international community) 
may both the exercise some sovereign authority and functions over a defined territory 
(Williams & Pecci 2004, p. 355). This stage is considered a “cooling-off period” (Bolton 
and Visoka, 2010, p. 5) as it specifically operates under the “mutually incompatible final 
aims” that the parties hold, as long as violence is, in effect, suspended (Hooper & Williams, 
2003, p. 360). 
 Institution-building: The establishment of “political and economic infrastructure,” as well 
as the construction or modification of “institutions for self-government” (Bolton & Visoka, 
2010, p. 5). This task is frequently carried out with the assistance of international 
community (Williams & Pecci, 2004, p. 355). 
 Determination of final status: The negotiation of the final status of the sub-state entity 
either by referendum or under the mediation of the international community (Williams & 
Pecci, 2004, p. 355). 
 
The Optional Elements of Earned Sovereignty: 
 Phased sovereignty: The devolution of sovereign functions from “the parent state (or 
international community) to the sub-state entity”(Bolton & Visoka, 2010, p. 6) during 
shared sovereignty. This stage may be achieved once the sub-state entity is seen as capable 
of holding these powers given its responsible behavior (Williams & Pecci, 2004, p. 356). 
 Conditional sovereignty: The fulfillment of liberal-democratic conditions, e.g., the 
protection of human and minority rights, and the enforcement of the rule of law (Bolton & 
Visoka, 2010, p. 6). Usually, this is monitored by a monitoring authority which involves 
international institutions (Williams & Pecci, 2004, p. 356).  
 Constrained sovereignty: The application of limits on the sovereign authority of the new 
state, e.g., by the continuance of international administration or military presence (Bolton 
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& Visoka, 2010, p. 6). This stage is considered a guarantee for the parent state and the 
international community (Williams & Pecci, 2004, p. 356). 
 
 
1.4.2. The practical application of Earned Sovereignty 
 
Initially, earned sovereignty was developed as “a policy prescription and conflict resolution 
strategy” specifically for Kosovo (Bolton & Visoka, 2010, p. 4). The influence of earned 
sovereignty approach can be traced in Rambouillet Peace Accords and UN Security Council 
Resolution 1244, the UN doctrine of “standards before status” and Ahtisaari’s 2006 status 
recommendation of “supervised independence” for Kosovo. Specifically, the “Standards before 
Status” policy supported the goals of the international engagement as well as progress in the liberal 
peacekeeping efforts in Kosovo.  What is more, this has later been applied to seven recent peace 
agreements concerning sovereignty-based conflicts such as East Timor, Serbia, and Montenegro, 
Northern Ireland, Bougainville and Papua New Guinea, Bosnia, Sudan, Israel/Palestine, Western 
Sahara (Williams & Pecci 2004, p. 10). 
As for Kosovo, Bolton and Visoka (2010) see it as a turning-point case which marks the 
“normative shift” from “sovereignty as authority of territory” to “sovereignty as responsibility” 
(p. 7). The earned sovereignty approach was initially developed for Kosovo by the Public 
International Law & Policy Group in 1998 (Williams & Pecci, 2004, p. 373). This was concluded 
as an attempt to meet the interests and the needs of Kosovars, Serbia, and the international 
community. This entailed a process whereby the people of Kosovo would be entitled to share 
sovereignty with FRY. The proposal considered that in light of “long history of human rights 
violations perpetrated against them by the Serbian regime” the people of Kosovo had, somehow, 
earned a right to increased sovereignty (Williams & Pecci, 2004, 373). Here we can trace the link 
between the concepts of earned sovereignty and remedial secession.  Overall, each of the elements 
of the earned sovereignty should be discussed in the recent history of Kosovo. 
Shared sovereignty in Kosovo was authorized by the United Nation Security Council 
Resolution 1244 (1999) which initially held responsible for almost all Kosovo's sovereign 
authority and functions (Hooper & Williams, 2011, p. 363). However, the resolution did not 
envision any clear political solution for Kosovo; it did not determine its status (Fridl, 2008, p. 73). 
As outlined by Wiliams (2003), the resolution  focused on: “(1) displacing FRY sovereignty from 
Kosovo, (2) replacing it with interim UN and NATO sovereign responsibilities (3) establishing 
substantial autonomy and democratic self-governance for the people of Kosovo (4) “facilitating a 
political process designed to determine Kosovo's futurere status, taking into account the 
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Rambouillet accords and (5) preparing in the final stage to administer the process of the transition 
of authority from provisional institutions to “institutions established under a political settlement”“ 
(p. 406). 
To illustrate, the U.N. Secretary-General created the United Nations Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) and appointed a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), aiming at 
reconstructing the political institutions of Kosovo. Throughout time the UNMIK representative 
worked to create a Kosovo Constitutional Framework providing for a parliament and presidency. 
This “mission” was carried out with the help of the NATO-led The Kosovo Force (KFOR). The 
consolidation of the branches of the government somehow managed to cool-off tensions, but it 
also set off the transition towards some “heightened sovereignty” for Kosovo, on condition they 
“earn” it by expressing their commitment to “democratic self-government” (Bolton & Visoka, 
2010, p. 4).  
When it comes to institution building, it was designed to be carried out in line with the 
norms of liberal democracies to lead the country towards democratization (Gheciu, 2005). While 
different international actors such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
(OSCE), the UNMIK embarked on the fulfillment of the task, the 2004 March riots, which resulted 
in casualties, injuries and destruction of properties (Fridl, 2009, p. 74),  put all these attempts and 
the whole idea of the success of the international society to ‘democratize” Kosovo under a big 
question mark.  
To start with, the phased-sovereignty was manifested by the attempts to involve the 
domestic actors into the tasks of governing the region. In 2001, UNMIK introduced the 
Constitutional Framework for Provisional Self-Government which provided the legal framework 
for Kosovo's self-governance (Bolton & Visoka, 2010, p. 11). It summarized various goals for 
Kosovo to achieve, such as non-discrimination, integration of parallel structures and the 
participation of women and representation of communities and municipalities were included in it. 
Moreover, the Provisional Institutions were supposed to follow the laws, investigate wrongdoings 
and for monitoring taking place within the structures. 
Regarding conditional sovereignty in 2002, the Special Representative of the UN 
Secretary-General Michael Steiner adopted a policy of “standards before status,” outlining some 
benchmarks regarding regional stability, freedom of movement, the rule of law. This policy 
entailed that to reach the stage of final status talks some standards should have been met (Hooper 
& Williams, 2011).  The benchmarks covered areas such as “functioning democratic institutions, 
the rule of law, freedom of movement, refugee returns and reintegration, economic reform and 
development, property rights, dialogue with Belgrade, and the responsible operation of the Kosovo 
Protection Corps” (UN, 2018). As Williams and Pecci (2004) claim the conditions were necessary 
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to eliminate the possible political instability that might arise with the discussions on final status. 
These conditions aimed to create equality, freedom, democratic structures and also a multi-ethnic 
society including all the ethnic and minority groups. 
Furthermore, regarding the determination of Kosovo's final status, considering the 
dangerous prospect of the legal limbo, in 2005, Secretary General Kofi Annan appointed former 
Finnish President and experienced diplomat, Martti Ahtisaari as Special Envoy for the Future 
Status Process for Kosovo. Ahtisaari’s task was “to lead the political process to determine the 
future status of Kosovo in the context of Resolution 1244 (1999)” (Fridl, 2009, p. 75). The 
negotiations were offering two possible scenarios: either Kosovo would attain “wide autonomy” 
within Serbia or gain full independence (Bolton & Visoka, 2010, pp. 7, 11). In the following year 
of negotiations, Serbia was willing to give Kosovo autonomy. However, Kosovo would accept 
nothing but independence; the situation was entering a stalemate. To prevent the negative 
consequences, Ahtisaari declared the potential of negotiations to be exhausted presenting the 
“Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement” to the UN Secretary-General, a 
document based on the approaches of Earned Sovereignty and Remedial Secession which was 
envisaging initially-supervised sovereignty for Kosovo (Bolton & Visoka, 2010, p. 13). 
 On 17 February 2008, the Kosovo Assembly declared Kosovo's independence which was 
met by an exclusively negative response from countries such as Serbia China, Russia, yet managed 
to gain 114 recognition by March 2018. Nevertheless, while Kosovo received a significant number 
of recognitions, its sovereignty is constrained, and it is highlighted in Kosovo’s 2009 constitution 
which states the authorities of the Republic of Kosovo shall have no jurisdiction “to review, 
diminish or otherwise restrict the mandate, powers, and obligations’ of the international civil and 
military presences” (Bolton & Visoka, 2010, p. 15). The mission of UNMIK, OSCE, and some 
international organizations constrain Kosovo’s sovereignty significantly. 
Overall, it is evident that the earned sovereignty approach was a serious attempt to regulate 
the development of Kosovo through the application of democratic peace framework, while the 
results and the actual success of the approach in the given case are highly contested, the amount 
of the work done cannot be denied. Given the volume and the involvement of the international 
community in the processes of Kosovo’s democratization as defined by earned sovereignty 
approach and later translated into the Ahtisaari plan and Kosovo’s declaration of independence, 
earned sovereignty offers various elements which can be instrumentalized for the recognition.  
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1.5. The politics of recognition of Kosovo 
Given, that the background of the Kosovo history is quite eminent, and the relevant parts 
of it were discussed by the previous sections, here, the thesis pays attention to the process of the 
recognition itself, and the works discussing it.  
As discussed, On February 17, 2008, Kosovo's Assembly declared the independence of the 
country by a statement, which received contradicting responses from the international community.  
While some states recognized the independence immediately, others took a critical stance 
objecting to recognize Kosovo. According to a statement released by the MFA of Kosovo, 114 
states have recognized Kosovo (Kosovo MFA, 2018). Shortly, after Kosovo’s Declaration of 
Independence, Serbia officially filed a request at the United Nations seeking opinion of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) with the aim of proving the invalidity of the declaration. 
Nevertheless, the decision of the ICJ, which arrived on 2010 held that the Kosovo declaration of 
Independence did not violate international Law (ICJ, 2010).  
Said that, the ICJ 2010 decision renewed the attention on the Kosovo case, which mainly 
formulated around the debates on whether the Kosovo case may set a precedent or not (Ker-
Lindsay, 2017; Kemoklidze, 2009). Despite the differences on this matter, Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence and the recognition of Kosovo intensified the desire of other secessionist entities 
to gain recognition. For example, Nagorno-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia have 
attempted to instrumentalize the Kosovo case for their recognition presenting it as a precedent-
setting case.  
Without attempting to take parallels between the cases mentioned above, one thing is obvious; 
there is no universal approach when it comes to state recognition. The inconsistency is apparent 
even within the case of Kosovo’s recognition: while some states choose to recognize Kosovo, 
others such as China, Russia and Armenia, opposed to do so. Moreover, choosing to recognize the 
recognizing entities justified their act in different ways as illustrated by Jessica Almqvist (2009) 
and Bolton and Visoka (2010). Subsequently, the lack of regulation of therecognition acts entails 
that where there is no regulation, the power of argumentation is used instrumentally to justify one's 
declared or undeclared political interests, or in the words of  Worster (2009), the rules of state 
recognition, while legal, serve as “legal vehicles for political choices" (p. 168).   
Regarding this point, Jessica Almqvist (2009) suggests the concept of “politics of recognition” 
and defines it as “the variety of the reactions of third States to the declaration of Kosovo 
Independence” (Ibid, 2). Moreover Bolton and Visoka (2011) also claim that in case of Kosovo 
the recognizing states put forward different arguments for their recognition. Human rights abuses 
under Milošević, a decade of international administration; Kosovo's statehood capacity; the 
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exhaustion of future status negotiations; and Kosovo's commitment to respect minority rights and 
accept ‘supervised independence' are some of the arguments that the recognizing states mention 
(Ibid). Thus the works carried out by these authors present a primary inquiry on the topic. 
However, the given research adds to the value of the question of Kosovo’s recognition without 
aiming to replicate or compare the findings with those of the given authors.  
Meanwhile, it presents a clear strategy of methodology which allow presenting a fresh take on 
the research area. First of all, the given research opens up the brackets of the concept of “politics 
of recognition” and analyses its components thoroughly, moreover, it focuses only on the positive 
reactions extending the data for the analysis up to (2018). Also, the thesis applies content analysis 
to get maximum results.  
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2. Methodology 
 
2.1.Research design: Single Case Study 
 
The research was carried out as a single interpretive case study, which allows explaining 
particular cases through the lenses of theoretical frameworks. Case study is a research strategy 
based on the in-depth empirical investigation of one or several phenomena which aims to 
“elucidate features of a larger class of (similar) phenomena, by developing and evaluating 
theoretical explanations”(Vanesson, n. d, p. 227) which can lead to an evaluation and refinement 
of theories. In other words, case studies observe the data at the micro level (Zainal, 2007, p. 2). 
When it comes to a single case study, in particular, Odell (2010) counts the case as an example of 
an event or phenomenon, which “allows making multiple observations of theoretically relevant 
variables” (p. 162). Last but not least, while case study does not have any pretentions of accounting 
to a new theory, it allows improving the existing conceptual and theoretical models by offering 
new suggestions based on the in-depth investigation of the given case (Odell, 2010).  
The Kosovo case was considered for this research because it provides the best opportunity 
to investigate and understand the politics of recognition for some reasons. The controversies and 
the debates revolved around the recognition of Kosovo in line with the support of the international 
community and the number of the recognition that it has received during the last ten years, make 
it a robust case for understanding the contemporary state recognition practices (Almqvist, 2009). 
The in-depth analysis of the case through the application of the chosen theoretical frameworks 
helps us identify whether “Self-Determination,”  “Remedial Secession,” “Earned Sovereignty” 
and “International law”  are sufficient to explain the justifications of the recognition or not. Thus, 
the inquiry into this topic allows making further implications on the explanatory power of the 
given theoretical frameworks specifically for the Kosovo case. The research does not aim to 
generalize the findings. Moreover, the theory of the politics of recognition tells that each case of 
recognition is different and cannot count as an example or guideline for the recognition of other 
entities. Thus, the research aims at sharpening the theoretical perspective of politics of the 
recognition of Kosovo. 
 
2.2.Research Method: Qualitative Content Analysis 
 
Given the nature of the research question, qualitative research method was considered as a 
tool of inquiry. In particular, the Qualitative Content Analysis was applied as a method for 
 33 
 
analyzing the data, which mainly consists of official recognition statements. The application of the 
qualitative content analysis for this research is valid as it aims to explore the arguments in the 
recognition statements on the textual level without assessing whether these are the actual reasons 
for recognition or not.  
Moreover, in line with counting the frequency of the categories, the QCA allows 
uncovering essential patterns and themes while interpreting the findings qualitatively (Zhang & 
Wildemuth, 2009).  The complex nature of the politics of recognition tells that the findings can be 
based not only on the counts of the central themes but also on the interpretation of each theme 
separately. While the frequencies of the categories allow identifying the general themes discussed 
in the recognition statements, the interpretation helps to identify the patterns or differences of the 
application of themes in different statements.  
The other strength of the method for the analysis of the qualitative data is that QCA 
modifies and inherits the strengths of the quantitative analysis, such as the guidance by rules, by 
the demands of qualitative research. In addition, QCA allows analyzing the data while reducing 
the amount of the material which was vital given the number and the volume of the recognition 
statements considered for the analysis. Meanwhile, reducing the amount of the material did not 
come at the expense of the quality of the research, because the requirement to examine “every 
single part of the material that is in any way relevant to the research question” (Schreier & Flick, 
2013) was followed strictly.  This requirement, in fact, limits the power of the researcher from 
intentionally excluding the parts which might otherwise be important for the research as “it 
requires a certain sequence of steps, regardless of the exact research question and material” 
(Schreier & Flick, 2013).  
In general, the analysis was carried out strictly following these steps as described by 
Schreier and Flick (2013):  1) Deciding on a research question; 2)Selecting material, 3)Building a 
coding frame, 4)Segmentation, 5)Trial coding, 6)Evaluating and modifying the coding frame, 
7)Main analysis, 8)Presenting and interpreting the findings.  
To continue, another advantage of the qualitative content analysis is its flexibility regarding 
the combination of data-driven and concept-driven categories. In this research, the concept-driven 
categories of “Remedial secession” “Earned-sovereignty” and “Self-determination” and 
“Accepted Legal Practices” were informed by the theoretical discussion on the politics of 
recognition.  Meanwhile, the data-driven codes were generated through the systematic analysis of 
the texts. The final list of the categories was generated through the development of broader 
categories and sub-categories. 
 Overall, content analysis has allowed identifying and systematically categorizing the 
textual evidence of the “politics of recognition” i. e. the different arguments and justifications 
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found in the recognition statements. Moreover, the interpretation of the findings with the 
qualitative approach has allowed illustrating the mismatch between what theory says about the 
given themes and the context in which states use these themes. In some cases, this step has allowed 
illustrating the way these arguments were instrumentalized, pointing out to the emergence of the 
politics of recognition.  
Last but not least, the research was carried out with the assistance of the MAXQDA 
software for Qualitative Data Analysis. The software is considered one of the best tools for 
organizing and interpreting a vast number of documents systematically (MAXQDA, 2018). This 
software has maximized the efficiency of the research as its key features prevail over the features 
of the manual analysis. In particular, it has allowed importing and organizing the data 
systematically saving more time for the main analysis and the interpretations of the findings. 
Moreover, MAXQDA has allowed precisely identify the most important categories and also the 
documents that present the most arguments, which identified the importance of the category for 
the politics of recognition and the eagerness of the given state to justify the act of recognition.  
Last but not least, while the research has followed the steps for the qualitative analysis 
carefully, it should be noted that still, it is the researcher who “chooses” to see the given categories 
and describe them in the given manner. It all affects the general outcome of the research. However, 
this must be seen as a part of the general limitations of the qualitative research. 
 
 
2.3.Data Collection  
 
The research has considered the official recognition statements i. e.  the statements 
presenting the arguments of the high-ranked officials (Ambassador, President, Prime Minister, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs) following (shortly) or prior (right before) to the act of recognition of 
the respective states recognizing Kosovo for analysis. The consideration of these statement for the 
research is essential, replicating what was emphasized by Jessica Almqvist (2009); “if and when 
the creation of a new state is uncontroversial, the specific contents of the different recognition 
statements seem uninteresting […] however, if it is controversial, such texts warrant closer 
attention” (p. 7).   
A question might arise what explains the choice of the data, why the official recognition 
statement instead of, for example, statements such as the written contributions of the UN-member 
states for the 2010 ICJ advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence? 
In fact, it is clear that the written statements of legal nature would naturally link their arguments 
to International law.  Moreover, every aspect of the Kosovo case would be discussed in these 
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opinions which would make it impossible to identify the primary and unique arguments not 
focused only on international law.  
 Unlike the statements which are contributions to a legal procedure,  the short and precise 
recognition statements or the statements presenting the view of the representatives of the states, 
summarize the aspects that each state finds the most important to justify the act of recognition 
publicly. Given this, the audience of these statements is not only the judges, the scholars and the 
state officials but also the broader public. Thus, the recognition statements may present more value 
for identifying the most robust arguments of the recognition statements for each state, without 
exhaustively discussing less intriguing aspects of the Kosovo case.   
Before presenting the strategy of the data collection, it is essential to specify what we mean 
by saying an “act of recognition.”  Murphy and Stancescu (2017) distinguish 1)De facto and de 
Jure recognition; 2)Express and tacit recognition; 3)Government recognition 4)Diplomatic 
recognition; depending on the chosen criteria(p. 8). Moreover, they indicate that, in practice, 
recognition can be manifested either explicitly or tacitly  “by any means from which it can be 
implied that the new state would be treated as any other international legal person” (Ibid, p. 8). 
Given this, the research has consulted not only the verbal notes directly sent to the MFA of Kosovo 
as a result of explicit recognition but also the other official statements deriving from the implicit 
recognition, i. e. found on other platforms rather than the MFA websites.  
The number of the recognition was estimated considering all the types of recognition 
identified by Murphy and Stăncescu (2017) and also referring to the official statement of the 
Kosovo MFA (2018) on the number of the recognition statements. Moreover, the “Kosovo Thanks 
You” online platform has also been used as a valid source to check the validity of the recognitions.  
However, when it comes to the withdrawal of recognition, a point needs to be clarified. While 
Guinea-Bissau recognized Kosovo in a verbal note on 10 January 2011, later on, November 21, 
2017, the MFA of Serbia informed that Guinea-Bissau had withdrawn the recognition (Serbia 
MFA, 2017).  However, On 2 February 2018,  Kosovo's MFA announced that it had received a 
new verbal note from Guinea-Bissau stating that the previous note revoking recognition did not 
affect (Kosovo MFA, 2018). Thus, at the final stages of the research, the first verbal note of 
Guinea-Bissau has eventually been considered for analysis.  
To guarantee the reliability of the data the research has, first of all, considered the sources 
published on the official websites of the Government of the recognizing states and Kosovo double-
checking them against other sources. A strict strategy divided by hierarchical steps has allowed 
maximizing the amount of the data.  When one of the steps failed to trace the pursued information, 
the following step was implemented. The strategy looks as follows:  
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1) looking for the official statements of recognition/verbal notes, or the statements presenting the 
arguments of the high-ranked officials of the recognizing states  following (shortly) or prior 
(right before) to the act of recognition,  released by the recognizing states on the official 
platforms of the respective countries 
2) searching the same statements at the webpage of the Kosovo MFA 
 
In case of the absence of verbal notes or official press releases, other types of sources were 
considered such us, 
1)  the words that have been exchanged during the recognition act by the high ranked officials 
of the recognizing state and published by official channels 
2) media articles directly quoting the statements or the exchanged words. 
3)  media articles paraphrasing the content of the statements  
All in all the data for the analysis consists of both primary and secondary sources. 
Last but not least the direction provided by the platform called “Kosovo Thanks You” has been 
extensively used as a guiding tool, as it contained a wide range of information and documents 
regarding the recognition of Kosovo. It is noteworthy that this platform was mentioned and used 
by scholars such as Jessica Almqvist, James Ker-Lindsay.  
Nevertheless, the acknowledgment of some limitations is also important. In fact, despite 
the exhaustiveness of the data collection strategy, not all the 114 recognition statements were 
available. In some cases, the information recognition was present on the Kosovo MFA website, 
accompanied with a note that verbal note will be sent to Kosovo MFA following the official 
recognition. However, it was not identified whether these verbal notes were sent to Kosovo or not. 
Either way, the content of these statements was unavailable, that is why the position of the given 
states was not considered for the analysis.  Meanwhile, in case of some other documents, while 
the verbal notes or press releases were present, the content of these statements was merely 
indicating the fact of recognition without further elaboration. Thus, similar statements were 
considered for the research and discussed under the category “Undefined.” Finally, not all the texts 
were available in English. To overcome the language barrier, the help of the native speakers of 
French, Italian, Dutch, Albanian, Arabic, Spanish languages was pursued for translations of these 
statements.  
Overall 85 statements from 87 states (including Taiwan) were considered for the analysis, 
among which 19 were identified as “Undefined.” Moreover, among these statements, there are two 
joint statements, one from Hungary, Croatia, and Macedonia and another one from Macedonia and 
Montenegro.  Additionally, a separate statement released by the Government of Hungary has also 
been considered for the research. However, this has been discussed separately from Croatia and 
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Macedonia and presented solely as the view of Hungary. It must be acknowledged that as a 
consequence of the decision to include two statements from Hungary the coding frame has 
identified more frequencies for this statement, however, the number is not significant to affect the 
general results of the findings. Moreover, this issue is not as essential as the analysis is based both 
on the overview of the frequencies of the statements per category and on the interpretations of the 
categories.  
 
2.4.Generating the coding frame  
 
Before proceeding to the interpretation of the findings, it is essential to describe the process 
of coding to eliminate the misunderstandings and to understand the strategy of the researcher given 
the challenges. Therefore, this section is a discussion of some decisions made during the process 
of qualitative data analysis, to identify and explain the existing issues in advance.  
As it has already been mentioned the main guiding material for the process of the coding 
has been “Qualitative Content Analysis” by Margrit Schreier and Uwe Flick (2013). As discussed, 
in the chapter on the method the article thoroughly explains the steps that a researcher should 
follow to get the maximum results from the analysis.  Not going into details of the whole process, 
it is important to highlight some vital moments connected to the generation and application of the 
coding frame.  
One of the most challenging parts regarding the generation of the coding frame was the 
existence of overlapping concepts and arguments found in the texts.  However, revising the coding 
frame multiple times has minimized this problem. The description of the code labels in line with 
the example of coded segments and the frequency of each category and sub-category clearly 
delineate the categories as presented in the Coding Frame (see Appendix 1).  The only thing that 
should be added regarding the coding frame is that the frequencies refer to the number of the 
countries (not statements, because as described in the data collection part, some statements were 
joint) which have used the arguments rather than the number of the coded segments of the texts.  
Furthermore, given that the data consists of official statements, regarding such a sensitive 
topic as the recognition of a new entity, each relevant part was considered for the analysis. The 
thorough explanation and the reading of the material have allowed bringing about the most 
important themes highlighted in the documents. In other words, the requirement of 
“exhaustiveness” was followed strictly. To illustrate, while the category “Religious ties” was 
identified in just three statements, it was still considered for analysis.   
.Moreover, considering the requirements of the qualitative research the unit of coding was 
based on thematic rather than formal criteria. It means that the unit of analysis was not strictly a 
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word, sentence or a paragraph, but theme i. e. a mixture of sentences, words and paragraphs 
(Schreier & Flick, 2013, p. 13).  Initially, codes were generated based on the most relevant 
arguments related to the aim of this research. Furthermore,  similar categories were merged and 
some others were split into sub-categories (see Appendix 1). It has allowed to better classifying 
the codes following the “mutually exclusiveness” requirement. 
Overall, the main categories for the research were generated both inductively and 
deductively. While the categories of “Popular Sovereignty,” “Remedial Secession,” “Earned 
Sovereignty,” and “Accepted legal practices” were generated in a concept-driven way (informed 
by the concepts in the theoretical framework), the documents have identified themes which were 
not covered by theory. Eventually, seven other main data-driven categories were also added: 
“Regional peace and stability,” “EU/NATO perspective,” “The position of other entities,” “Unique 
case,” “Religious ties”; “Undefined.” Moreover, some of these categories were divided to sub-
codes to discuss the themes more systematically.  It should be clarified that the category “Popular 
Sovereignty” combines the arguments which are indicated by the discussion on “self-
determination.” However, in the given case “the will of the people” was separated from “self-
determination” type of arguments as the latter has stronger wording which comes with legal 
consequences. The theme was named “Popular Sovereignty” as it allows avoiding the confusion. 
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3. Discussion of the findings 
 
3.1. Overview of the general findings 
 
The analysis of the recognition statements (see, Table. 1) indicates that the variety of the 
themes identified by the research not only reflect the emergence of the “politics of recognition” 
but also allow refining the theoretical discussions on the recognition of Kosovo. In particular, 
while the presence of the theory-driven categories identifies the presence of the theoretically 
informed arguments in the recognition statements, the data-driven categories indicate new patterns 
of argumentations which can be introduced to the theory of the politics of recognition. Meanwhile, 
while the frequency of the categories allows pointing out the most relevant themes for the politics 
of recognition of Kosovo, it is the interpretation of these findings that uncover the delicate context 
of the application of one or another category, which tells us more about the politics of recognition. 
Nevertheless, it is the frequencies that indicate which themes serve as the best tools for justifying 
the recognition or putting it in a context which makes recognition seem acceptable. 
 However, as discussed, the given research does not consider the explanatory power of 
these themes or arguments for the recognition of Kosovo. It just illustrates the way states “sell” 
the act of recognition to the wider audience on the textual level. In other words, the identified 
themes or arguments are considered as tools for justification and not the actual reasons for it. 
Finally, the research does not evaluate whether these themes are the actual motivations for the act 
of recognition or not.  
Before proceeding to the interpretation of the themes, it is essential to give an overview of 
the analyzed data and the general findings briefly. First, the analysis identified the general picture 
of the politics of recognition in the case of Kosovo. In particular, the research indicated the 
importance of the elements of “Earned Sovereignty” approach for the recognizing states as 
reflected in around 36 recognition statements. In particular, Kosovo’s commitment to 
democratization which is labeled as „conditional sovereignty“ is highlighted by most of the states. 
Moreover, the importance of the “Ahtisaari plan” is also apparent. Finally, the sub-category of 
“supervised independence”  tells us that the recognizing states give importance to Kosovo’s 
willingness to allow the international actors participate in the processes of state-making in  Kosovo 
even after the independence. 
Furthermore, the second most discussed theme found in the recognition statements is  
“Regional peace and stability.” This importance of the theme is apparent not only considering the 
number of the recognition statements referring to it, but also the fact that it was generated in a 
data-driven way. The same applies to the categories  “EU/NATO perspective” and the “positions 
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of other entities.” Overall, these data-driven themes indicate that the politics of recognition at least 
in case of Kosovo is quite complicated regarding the diversity of the arguments. 
Furthermore, another observation refers to the themes “Remedial Secession” and “Popular 
Sovereignty.”  While the theory indicated that “self-determination” does not provide the best 
argumentation for recognition statements the analysis identified that nine states had used this 
argument explicitly.  In contradiction, while the elements of “Remedial secession” were evident 
in the Kosovo case and the scheme itself allowed more room for justifying the recognition of 
Kosovo, as opposed to the general right to “self-determination,” only ten states highlighted it in 
their statements.  
Also, the general discussions on the themes identified by the systematic application of 
content analysis have illustrated that the justifications of Kosovo’s recognition, differ not only 
from state to state but also within the statements of each state. Moreover, many states coupled their 
arguments instead of presenting only one argument. What is more, while some states gave the 
whole picture of the arguments stating the direct or indirect influence on the decision of 
recognition, others preferred not to bring any justifications at all. Meanwhile, while some of the 
arguments within the themes were instrumentalized to justify the act of recognition explicitly, 
others were there to support the point implicitly, without inferring any link between recognition 
and the given argument. 
To continue the discussion, the analysis identified that while countries from different parts 
of the world highlight the importance of “Regional Peace and Stability,” it is mostly the European 
states that value the “EU/NATO perspective” of the Balkans.  Notably, the theme “EU/NATO” 
perspective in most of the cases comes hand in hand with “Regional Peace and stability.” 
Meanwhile, the statements discussing the importance of the implementation of the “Ahtisaari 
plan” emphasize it in light of the conditions which are summarised under the theme “Conditional 
sovereignty.” 
Finally, most of the arguments are found in the recognition statements of the US, Albania, 
Hungary. Overall, these states, mostly refer to elements such as “Conditional sovereignty,” 
“supervised independence,” “EU/NATO perspective.” Apart from the considerations for 
“Regional peace and stability,” these states clearly illustrate that the new member of international 
community i. e. Kosovo must become a democratized western state which meets certain conditions 
especially those regarding general human rights.  Finally, when it comes to the category 
“Undefined,” it is mostly the non-Western states, in particular, the African states that choose to 
remain silent. 
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Thus, while the general overview of the analysis indicates some patterns and characteristics 
of the data, the delicate process of the emergence of the “politics of recognition.” is uncovered by 
the interpretation of these themes discussed separately. 
 
 
3.2. Interpretation of the findings 
 
3.2.1. Popular Sovereignty 
 
The discussion on the category “Popular Sovereignty” summarises the arguments which 
highlight the people’s right to deciding their own political future. Considering that “self-
determination” is a strong wording with legal consequences it was analyzed and discussed more 
thoroughly separate from  “the will of the people.” 
Self-determination: The discussion on the theoretical part regarding the evolution of the concept 
of self-determination has illustrated that this principle with all the consequences that come with its 
application,  has been disfavoured by the community of sovereign and independent states as it was 
always perceived to be challenging the principle of territorial integrity. Thus, before the data 
analysis, the expectation was that states would hold back from referring to the “principle of self-
determination” in the recognition statements. However, the analysis has identified that nine 
countries have explicitly used the term “self-determination” while talking about Kosovo’s 
independence, and nine others have referred to the “will of the people” in their statements. The 
thorough analysis of the usage of the argument of “Self-determination” is essential, as the 
discussion of the principle is central to the whole research.  
To start with, the research has identified that even headlines of short statements may make 
important statements. For example, the headline of the statement released by Micronesia reads as 
such: “FSM Recognizes Kosovo Act of Self-Determination” (Micronesia Government, 2008). 
While the following short text does not offer further clarifications, the headline is enough to 
consider that “self-determination” is the central argument to justify the act of recognition. 
Furthermore,  UAE states that the recognition is in line with her support to a “legitimate right to 
self-determination”(Balkan Insight, 2008) without clarifying further. Meanwhile,  Togo highlights 
“self-determination” it in light of general considerations for peace (ToGo, 2014)․  In fact, these 
brief references make an important point about “self-determination” presenting it as an essential 
factor for recognition. 
 Moreover, the remaining statements offer more clear context for “self-determination.” For 
example, the statement from Afghanistan clarifies that the basis for the recognition was the “belief 
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in genuine human aspirations, the right to self-determination.” (Pajhwok report, 2008). Also, in 
the same statement, in line with the principle of self-determination, Afghanistan presents notions 
such as “democratic norms”  and the “spirit of peaceful co-existence among nations of the world” 
(Ibid) as decisive for the recognition. Thus, the statement implicitly presumes that “self-
determination” is a matter of democracy and a condition for peace. Overall, Afghanistan’s 
reference to self-determination” entails less limited application of the principle as a valid condition 
for recognition. Moreover, highlighting that it was the people of Kosovo who gave a “popular 
verdict,” the statement allows to think that it is the right of the people to opt for independence and 
the international community has no other choice but accept the facts on the ground. Thus, the usage 
of the term “self-determination” within such a context may leave a room for other secessionists to 
invoke “self-determination” as a valid condition for independence by referring to the case of 
Kosovo. 
In the same way, Albania justifies the recognition by the idea of the “rights of people for 
self-determination”  also mentioning the Declaration of Independence of the Kosovo Assembly 
and “the principle of good-neighborhood relations” (Albania Government, 2008). Here, the 
question is what the “principle of good-neighborhood relations” in international law entails 
regarding the recognition. Does this principle imply the existence of a custom which makes 
neighbors recognize a new entity as a state just because it is a neighbor? Without going deeper 
into the discussion of the principle of “good-neighborhood relations,” it is enough to say that the 
thorough research on “self-determination” has not identified it among the factors offering a room 
for an external right to “self-determination” or among the ones imposing the states to recognize 
another entity. This example illustrates how far the interpretations can go if the statements are 
instrumentally accompanied by concepts that are not necessarily directly linked to the matter.  
In contrast, the statement provided by Egypt puts the principle of “self-determination” in 
the context of international law. The document links “self-determination” to the provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations on the right of peoples to “self-determination” and the advisory 
opinion of the ICJ (2010). Moreover, the overall context of the provisions in the statements is in 
the light of establishing “international peace and security” (Egypt MFA, 2013). One may assume 
that this statement creates an opportunity for Egypt to present herself as a democratic member of 
the community of sovereign states serving the interests of Egypt. However, while at first glance 
the choice of such a context may seem rational, in fact, it appears to be more dangerous due to the 
ambiguity of its interpretation. To illustrate, as discussed in the theoretical part the UN Charter did 
not entail the right of secession for national minorities or colonial peoples. Similarly, stating that 
the act of recognition is not illegal, the ICJ did not claim that secession is legal. Thus, the statement 
reads the provisions of international law regarding the concept of “self-determination” outside the 
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intended context intentionally, or it is done unintentionally, due to the superficial reading of the 
Charter of United Nations, either way, undermining the authority and the power of international 
law. Overall, the misinterpretation of the provisions of accepted legal practices marks the 
emergence of the “politics of recognition.”  
Furthermore, less surprising is Slovenia’s and Taiwan’s choice to include “self-
determination” among the conditions for recognizing Kosovo. In fact, Slovenia’s statement 
highlights that the recognition was granted  “on the grounds of the right of nations to self-
determination, which was the basic argument for Slovenia's secession from the former Yugoslavia 
in 1991” (Balkan Insight, 2008). 
 Similarly, Taiwan expresses her sympathy to Kosovo’s struggle for independence 
claiming that “Self-determination is a sacred right recognized in the United Nations Charter” 
(Taiwan MFA, 2008). This statement is interesting as to say that “self-determination” is a sacred 
right, may entail that such an act should be welcomed without questions as it is not a matter of 
profane judgments but one of sacred dimension. Subsequently, the statement asserts admirations 
to the people of Kosovo “who despite obstacles” have had the courage of their convictions and 
peacefully marched towards independence” (Ibid). Here, the problem is the way short statements 
summarise history, presenting just the view of the “winner.”  To say that Kosovo has peacefully 
marched towards independence is to ignore the violence that has been expressed in the Kosovo 
conflict by both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians. Moreover, the statement ends with references to 
“democracy and freedom,” (Ibid) words that would make any statement look credible. While, this 
might refer to the period of “international supervision” which, started from 1999, there have been 
many cases of violence such as the 2004 riots, which have questioned the overall democratization 
of the country. In general, both Slovenia’s and Taiwan’s statements reflect the subjective 
incentives of these countries to recognize Kosovo. These arguments make sense to make the 
decision acceptable to the domestic audience while following their interests. 
Also, Australia couples the respect of “the decision of the people of Kosovo,” (Australia 
MFA, 2008) with the “positions of the other states” and the elements of “earned sovereignty” 
approach, which altogether is meant to guarantee “regional peace and stability.”  Among these 
statements, the one provided by Ireland also differs, as it refers to the fact that “90% of Kosovo’s 
population wants independence” (Ireland MFA, 2008) bearing in mind the “nine years under UN-
led interim administration” and considering the support of the EU partners. Moreover, the 
“exhaustion of the negotiations” also seems to be a principal argument in this statement (Ibid). 
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The will of the people: The statements from eight countries have referred to “the will of the 
people,” while discussing the reasoning for the recognition. For example, Thailand, Bangladesh, 
Pakistan conceptualize their recognition as a sign of respect or solidarity towards the will of the 
people of Kosovo (Kosovo MFA, n. d.; b92, 2009; Pakistan MFA, 2012). Meanwhile, Malaysia  
intends to “help meet” (UNPO 2008) these aspirations by her act of recognition and Saudi Arabia  
presents it  as important for “regional peace and stability.” (Dhaka Tribune, 2017). 
To sum up, despite the fact that theory entails the possibility of external self-determination 
only within the context of decolonization or in specific cases as a remedy of last resort for human 
right abuses, some states have applied “self-determination” as an instrument to justify their act of 
recognition. While the number of the statements referring to this principle is not very big, the 
further analysis illustrated how some states interpret the principle according to their understanding 
of the principle combining it with their interests, which already indicates the instrumentalization 
of these arguments for the political interests of the given states.  
   
 
3.2. 2. Remedial secession 
 
When it comes to the theme defined as “remedial secession” certain thing should be 
clarified before proceeding to the analysis. First of all, “remedial secession” and “earned 
sovereignty” are linked to each other in a way that the former makes up the basis for the “earned 
sovereignty” approach. The theory of Remedial Secession identifies the possibility of secession as 
a weaker right, meaning that it does not lead to recognition as to gain the recognition the entity has 
to meet some criteria in the future. Nevertheless, while these elements of “remedial secession” and 
“earned sovereignty” complement each other, the schemes allow to discuss them separately. 
The discussion of Remedial Secession as a theory addressing secessionist conflicts while 
constraining the general “national self-determination” type of claims to independence,  makes the 
theme less intimidating. Thus, the expectation was that having already decided to recognize 
Kosovo as an independent state “remedial secession”  would offer the best way to justify the act 
of recognition. This framework would entail that Kosovo's recognition does not count as a 
validation of general secessionist claims based on the general right of national self-determination 
but as one of “remedial secession” which would reduce the number of the “qualified” cases for 
secession. Justifying the recognition through the elements of remedial secession might seem less 
problematic as it offers a way to overcome the concerns for territorial integrity which usually 
comes with “self-determination.” Not denying the possibility that the states might invoke this 
argument sincerely, out of the belief that Kosovo deserves a recognition based on the remedial 
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scheme, it would also be done so by rational calculations; while the recognition is “inevitable” it 
would offer the best way to explain the recognition post factum. 
However, the analysis has identified that  only ten states emphasize this theme in their 
statements. Moreover, none of the statements emphasized the period when Kosovo’s autonomy 
was abolished. Nonetheless, the theme is not as popular as the theoretical discussions expected.  
 
Violations of human rights: In the given of the research, the discussion considers all the references 
to violations of human rights by Serbia. Some statements echo this condition coupled with 
arguments such as “no alternative” and “unique case.”  
To illustrate,   the government of Costa Rica has stated that it is understandable that the 
decision of Kosovo’s authorities to part ways with Serbia is not surprising given “the crimes 
against humanity” perpetrated by then-President Slobodan Milosevic’s regime” (The Tico times, 
2008). Similar arguments make a strong statement supporting the remedial right to secession. 
Furthermore, labeling Kosovo as a unique case, Canada explains that among other things the 
uniqueness is conditioned by its recent history characterized by “war and ethnic cleansing” (Balkan 
Insight, 2008).  
Likewise, in the statement released by the US Secretary of the time Condoleezza Rice, the 
main arguments start concerning the “brutal attacks’’ on the Kosovar population (US Government, 
2008). Generally, the statement justifies the NATO-led attacks by the very fact of the violations 
of human rights (Ibid).  Furthermore,  in the released statement, Jean Asselborn,  the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of the time of Luxembourg of the time justifies the intervention of the international 
community in Kosovo in a similar manner by referring to the atrocities committed in this territory 
before the 1999 NATO military operation. Thus, in the meanwhile, the violation of human rights 
is referred to justify another act which is the international intervention.  
Overall, the analysis has identified “violations of human rights” theme in only four 
statements which use the arguments in different ways. Moreover, with references to this theme, 
the states aim to justify either the recognition, the uniqueness of the Kosovo case or the UN-led 
international intervention in 1999. These differences are also a part of  the politics of recognition.  
  
No Alternative: The next and the last sub-category discussed under the general “remedial 
secession” theme is called “no alternative.” According to the discussion on theoretical part 
regarding the Remedial Theory of secession,  remedial right to secession is presented as a remedy 
of last resort: once all the other options of autonomy have been attempted and failed then secession 
may become a remedy of last resort. Several statements also stress out that recognition offered the 
best way out of the stalemate.  
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All in all, eight countries have used this argument in their statements, where they present 
different scenarios on why there was no alternative to Kosovo’s independence. In the analyzed 
statement Austria assures that the decision of recognition is not hasty and presents the only realistic 
and possible path out of the stalemate (Austria MFA, 2008).  Furthermore, the given statement 
highlights that the status quo could not be maintained becoming a constant source of instability 
(Ibid). Thus, Austria justifies its recognition by the considerations of “regional peace and stability” 
which left “no alternative” to Kosovo’s independence.  
Similarly, the statements of Lithuania and the US suggest that Kosovo’s independence 
provides the only viable solution to the situation offering the perspective of safety and stability in 
the region (Lithuania Seimas, 2008; US Government, 2008). Moreover, similar reasonings were 
found in Hungary’s statement, according to which Kosovo’s internationally supervised 
independence may offer the best way-out of the created situation (Hungary Government, 2008). 
The position of the Government of Hungary is that “the independence of Kosovo is the only 
sustainable solution in the current situation which will provide the perspective of safety and 
stability in the region” (Ibid).  Thus, while stating that there is “no alternative” to independence 
the countries highlight this in light of the general concerns for “regional peace and stability.”  
To continue, some states have mentioned that there was “no alternative” in light of the 
ethnic cleansing or the legacy of the conflict. For example, Ireland’s statement straightforwardly 
argues that the legacy of the conflict “made the return of Serb dominion in Kosovo unthinkable, 
and also undermined the prospects for a long-sought compromise” (Ireland MFA,2008). A similar 
point has highlighted Malta’s Foreign Minister of that time Tonio Borg claiming that there is no 
other alternative given “the events that took place in and around Kosovo in the past ten years.” 
(The Malta Independent, 2008) Similarly, the statement of Peru also couples the “no alternative” 
argument with the history that has revolved around Kosovo which has involved “the intervention 
of the United Nations and the Security Council” (Andina, 2008).   
Finally, the answer to why there is no alternative to the Kosovo conflict was the 
“unsustainable nature of the status quo” in some of the analyzed texts. As Hungary’s statement 
reads: “It has become clear that the status quo in Kosovo was unsustainable and moving forward 
in the settlement was necessary for the lasting stability and development of the region” (Hungary 
MFA, 2008). Similarly,  the statement of the Czech Republic reads as such: “The policy of the 
Czech Republic is based upon the conviction that the recognition of Kosovo’s independence [...] 
will provide a realistic way out of the current, untenable, situation” (Radio Praha, 2008). Also, 
Luxembourg’s statement entailed that “maintaining the ‘status quo’ will surely produce a unilateral 
declaration of independence within a very short time (The EU-28 Watch, 2008).  Moreover, the 
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statement entails that there is no alternative to the facts. Thus, entailing that, that Kosovo’s 
independence was a fact, Luxembourg adheres to the Declarative view of recognition.  
Overall, this category identified that for some states the argument of no alternative is crucial 
in light of the considerations of “regional peace and stability,” “unsustainable nature of the status 
quo” and the events that happened in the past. Thus, even the stalemate is assessed by several 
factors and not a common one.    
     
 
3.2.3. Earned sovereignty  
 
The analysis identified “earned sovereignty”  as being one of the most important themes 
highlighted by the recognizing states in their statements. Without implying that the recognizing 
countries genuinely believe that meeting a certain set of standards and benchmarks is enough to 
gain recognition, this part of the analysis identifies that at least on the textual level meeting these 
conditions facilitated the recognition process. Thus, the analysis has identified some elements of 
“standards before status” in the statements, presented in the theoretical part.  
 
 
3.2.3.1. Exhaustion of Negotiations 
 
The first theme of “Earned sovereignty” approach identified by the thorough analysis of 
the recognition statements is “exhaustion of negotiations.”   
To start with, in the analyzed statement the German Government shares her conviction that 
“further negotiations would not have resulted in a breakthrough” (German Government, 2008), 
which makes the German government believe that the rapid recognition would be the only viable 
solution for recognition. Meanwhile, the statement of Hungary suggests that the assessment of the 
situation in Kosovo identified that “there was no optional solution acceptable to both sides and the 
potential for further negotiations had been exhausted” (Hungary MFA, 2008). Similarly, the 
Minister of Foreign affairs of Ireland and the Government of Sweden indicate that years of talks 
failed to produce an agreement between Belgrade and Pristina and that the efforts of the  UN 
Security Council were also unable to offer a status solution (Ireland MFA, 2008; The Local, 2008). 
Likewise, Ireland explains the failure of the negotiations with the “legacy of the conflict” 
and links the need to recognition to the “will of the people” of Kosovo and the hope that the 
conditions outlined in the “Ahtisaari plan” will be implemented (Ireland MFA, 2008).  
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Furthermore, in their joint statement, Montenegro and Macedonia emphasize their efforts to help 
the negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina stating that “the declaration of independence of 
Kosovo came after the failure of the international community efforts for Belgrade and Pristina 
negotiations to result in a solution for Kosovo status” (Montenegro Government, 2008).  
Last but not least, some of the most interesting points regarding this theme are in the 
statement offered by Luxembourg. The statement reflects discussions regarding the status of 
Kosovo before the Declaration of independence. During the discussion, one of the speakers 
emphasizes that it is the responsibility of the international community and the EU to act in the face 
of the exhaustion of agreements even if it entailed bypassing the UN Security Council (the EU-28 
Watch, 2008). Moreover, the speaker claims that “Russia would like to continue the negotiations, 
even if they lasted for years, even dozens of years and it wants to maintain the ‘status quo’ in the 
meantime” (Ibid) implying that Russia will not change her position. 
 Thus, while several statements identify the “exhaustion of agreements” as affecting the act 
of recognition, it is only the statements of Luxembourg and Ireland that identify why the further 
negotiations were impossible.  
 
 
3.2.3.2. Conditional Sovereignty 
 
The analysis of the recognition statements indicated Kosovo’s commitment to democratic 
processes to be the most significant sub-theme for this category summarised under the theme 
“conditional sovereignty.”  All in all, while some states praise Kosovo for its commitment to the 
process of democratization including the willingness to upholding to human, minority rights, other 
states express their hopes that Kosovo will do so in the future. Also, while some countries highlight 
this point separately, others refer to it within the frames of the Ahtisaari plan.  
Thus, in the analyzed statement Albania hails Kosovo’s commitment to creating a 
“democratic, secular and multiethnic society” (Albania Government, 2008).  Moreover, it asserts 
that “despite ethnic background every Kosovan citizen would feel himself a free citizen in his 
home and its property, equal before law, guaranteeing the protection of rights and freedoms of 
individual and minorities” (Ibid). Similarly, Antigua and Barbuda welcome Kosovo’s efforts “to 
build a democratic society and be guided by the principles of equal rights, justice, and peace” 
(Kosova Live 360, 2015). In the same way, Australia’s statement makes some considerations for 
the future reminding that Kosovo must prioritize the minority rights and the protection of “cultural 
heritage sites” (Austraia MFA, 2008). Similarly, the statement from Iceland presents the country’s 
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expectation that Kosovo will fulfill the obligations set out in the Declaration of independence, in 
particular,  to respect human rights and the rights of minorities fully (Iceland Government, 2008).   
To continue, the statement of Turkey presents an interesting choice of arguments as it states 
that “the rule of law and the universal values of human rights, democracy and pluralism should be 
promoted in Kosovo” (Turkey MFA, 2008). Given Turkey’s negative record of Human rights in 
the last decade, it is interesting to see her endorsing another state to uphold such values. Similar 
statements not only illustrate that this argument is used instrumentally but also creates a chance 
for Turkey to present herself as a “western” state with  “democratic” values.  
Likewise, Belize congratulates “the people of Kosovo for their decision to move towards 
independence and to ensure that democratic processes are protected and respected” (Balkan 
Insight, 2008). Moreover, the statement supports Kosovo’s readiness to “ensure the promotion and 
protection of all human rights including the fundamental rights of all people involved even 
minority groups” (Ibid). Meanwhile, Hungary Croatia, Bulgaria in their joint statement express 
their hopes that Kosovo institutions will guarantee the rule of law and rights for the members of 
the Serbian community(Croatia, MFA, 2008). Also, the statement of Czech Republic assures that 
these rights will be upheld (Radio Praha, 2008). Finally, Canada emphasizes Kosovo’s 
development into a democratic, multi-ethnic state that “fully respects human rights” (Balkan 
Insight, 2008). These arguments are presented in light of the considerations for the peace,  political 
stability and economic progress in the Balkans. 
 
 
3.2.3.3. Elements of the Declaration of independence and the Ahtisaari plan 
 
Declaration of independence: The references to the elements of the “Declaration of 
Independence” are found in the statements of the Czech Republic, Turkey, Lithuania, Latvia and 
Iceland. To illustrate the statement of Czech Republic asserts the agreement  “with the terms on 
which this independence has been declared” (Radio Praha, 2008). In the same way, Turkey states 
that the content and elements of the Declaration of Independence have affected the decision to 
recognize Kosovo’s independence (Turkey MFA, 2009). Furthermore, in the statement of Latvia, 
the elements of the principles of Declaration are held in “high estimation” (Latvia MFA, 2018). 
Likewise, Iceland also states the expectation that Kosovo will fulfill the obligations set out in the 
declaration.  
 
Ahtisaari plan: According to the analysis, the Ahtisaari plan is underlined by the recognizing 
states in the statements of around 15 countries which are mostly Western states except for Sierra 
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Leone. Considering that the plan makes up the basis of Kosovo’s Declaration of independence, it 
was not surprising that many countries mention both documents parallelly outlining the same 
provisions. Some of the references to the “Ahtisaari plan” were presented in light of the elements 
of democratization, in particular, highlighting the minority rights. It turns out that many countries 
have hailed this document to be important stating that Kosovo’s willingness to implement the 
document has influenced their decision to recognize the country. Overall, some states positively 
assess Kosovo's attempts to meet the standards which were developed in the “Standards before 
Status” plan and later reflected in the Ahtisaari plan. In particular, the statements of Iceland, 
Luxembourg, Japan, Sierra-Leone, Poland, Hungary, Macedonia, and Montenegro, highlight this 
theme.   
To start with, in the given statement Albania hails “the commitment of Assembly of 
Kosovo in Declaration of Independence to implement Ahtisaari plan” (Albanian Government, 
2008). Likewise, the statement from Belgium identifies that the condition for recognition  “was 
that the Kosovars would respect the plan of the Finnish mediator Martti Ahtisaari, who must 
guarantee the rights of the Serb minority and the protection of the cultural and religious heritage 
in Kosovo” (HLN, 2008).  
Furthermore, Denmark presents one of the most thorough discussions on the Ahtisaari plan. 
Stating that Kosovo’s commitment to implementing the Ahtisaari plan and establishing a 
democratic, secular and multi-ethnic state, is vital for the Danish government, the statement also 
refers to “international supervision”  (Denmark MFA, 2009). Moreover, according to the same 
document, it is the EU  that “will contribute to the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan for 
Kosovo” (Ibid). Likewise, in the analyzed statement similar to Denmark, the US especially stresses 
out elements such as  “multi-ethnicity as a fundamental principle of good governance” and 
Kosovo’s willingness to accept  “period of international supervision” (Ibid.). The statement of 
Ireland echoes similar points, which apart from outlining the provisions in details, also hails 
Kosovo’s commitment to implement the Ahtisaari recommendations fully (Ireland, MFA, 2008). 
Additionally, Estonia‘s  foreign minister of that time, Urmas Paet, emphasizes that the best 
plan for Kosovo is the status settlement and schedule proposed by Martti Ahtisaari (Estonia MFA, 
2008). In line with the minority rights, the statement highlights the protection of the cultural 
heritage of minorities (Ibid). Also, Latvia's Foreign Minister of that time, Maris Riekstins,  outlines 
the importance of the Ahtisaari plan for the future growth of Kosovo, among other things pointing 
out to the “protection of minorities and the inviolability of religious and cultural heritage” (Latvia, 
MFA, 2008). Meanwhile, in the given context, it is only the statement by the Norwegian 
Government that emphasizes the importance of the protection of the Serbian Orthodox Church in 
Kosovo (Norway Government, 2008). 
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What is more, apart from emphasizing the uniqueness of the Kosovo case and the 
importance of the Ahtisaari plan, Hungary outlines the importance of “a functioning market 
economy” (Hungary MFA, 2008).  Moreover, the document states that Hungary will follow the 
implementation of these provisions within the frames of “supervised independence” (Ibid).  
Nonetheless, Japan’s recognition statement claims that Kosovo's intention to run the country under 
the “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement» made by the U.N. Special Envoy” 
(Japan MFA, 2008) is clear. Finally, the only African country highlighting the minority rights is 
Sierra Leone, that also hails the importance of the provisions of this document (WikilLeaks, 2008). 
Overall, it is evident that the Ahtisaari plan offers a substantial ground for the states to 
justify their recognition referring to it. The provisions outlined in the plan are multidimensional 
and crucial for Kosovo‘s democratization.  
 
 
3.2.3.4. International Supervision and Supervised Independence 
 
International Supervision: International supervision refers to the arguments which highlight the 
importance of the international presence of Kosovo before the declaration of independence. For 
example, Australia reminds that Kosovo has passed its “long and difficult road to peace” (Australia 
MFA, 2008). Moreover, the statement gives credits to the international actors that have assisted in 
passing this road: ”the United Nations and NATO have worked tirelessly since 1999 to assist in 
setting up self-governing institutions and to help the people of Kosovo rebuild their lives” (Ibid). 
However, stating that much remains to be done and calling for the UN and European Community, 
to “continue efforts to bring about a lasting peaceful future for Kosovo and the region” (Ibid) 
Australia highlights the link between the past and the future of the “international supervision” of 
Kosovo.  
Similarly, Sweden states that the fact that “Kosovo had been under UN control since 1999” 
has influenced the decision to recognize Kosovo (The Local, 2008). Moreover, the  US discusses 
the theme in light of the UN-led intervention in 1999, stating that since that time “Kosovo has built 
its own democratic institutions separate from Belgrade’s control” (US government, 2008). Here, 
one can trace the link to “institution building,” which is another element of Earned Sovereignty 
scheme. Also, another country, which discusses the “institution building in the statement is the 
Dominican Republic. The analyzed statement congratulates the authorities and the people of 
Kosovo “for their achievements and establishment of the institutional structures that enabled the 
people of Kosovo to have a sovereign country internationally recognized” (Kosovo MFA, 2009). 
Thus, while the US indirectly links the recognition to “institution building” without emphasizing 
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it as a key reason for recognition,  Dominican Republic conceptualizes “institution building” as 
crucial for recognition.  
 
Supervised Independence: The general discussion on the category “Earned Sovereignty” has 
emphasized that some countries discuss different elements of “Earned sovereignty” in their 
statements simultaneously. However, the careful analysis has identified that some of these 
elements were referred to more frequently, leading to assumptions, that these elements matter more 
for the politics of recognition. “supervised independence” is one of those elements.  
Overall, around 17 countries touch upon the theme “supervised independence”  some of 
which do so in the context of the “Ahtisaari Plan.” Albania and Denmark, for example,  positively 
assess Kosovo’s commitment to implement the provisions highlighted in the Ahtisaari plan, which 
also entails elements of “supervised independence.” Albania invites to welcome  “the EU and 
NATO international, civil and military presence in Kosovo.” (Albania Government, 2008). 
Meanwhile, Denmark outlines Kosovo's commitment to accept international community’s 
monitoring of the implementation of Ahtisaari plan claiming that “the European Union has shown 
determination by launching an ESDP mission and by appointing an EU Special Representative 
that will contribute to the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan for Kosovo” (Denmark MFA, 
2009).  Here, the importance given to the presence of  the EU is apparent.  
  To continue, the statement of the US  puts Kosovo’s commitment to “welcome a period of 
international supervision” in the same sentence with the commitment to “embrace multi-ethnicity 
as a fundamental principle of good governance” (US Government, 2008). It entails that 
“supervised independence” is there first of all to keep track of Kosovo’s democratization 
processes. Furthermore, while Belize supports Kosovo’s willingness to cooperate “with the 
international community during the international supervision period” (Balkan insight, 2008) and 
Switzerland welcomes its willingness to “accept the presence of international civilian and military 
forces in the region,” (Swissinfo, 2008). Similar context offers the statement of Sierra Leone which 
discusses Kosovo’s willingness to support “continued international supervision of Kosovo based 
on United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244” (WikiLeaks, 2008).  Meanwhile, the in the 
analyzed statement Dominica notes that since its declaration of independence Kosovo has been 
committed to cooperating with the international community “especially in the United Nations, to 
resolve conflicts with its neighbors.” (Kosovo MFA, 2012). Here the emphasis transitions from 
democratization to peace and stability.   
Moreover,  Bulgaria, Croatia, and Hungary state their support for the EU/NATO efforts to 
democratize Kosovo. While these countries have released a joint statement, Hungary’s separate 
statement, which has also been considered for the analysis, adds: “Hungary has concluded that 
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Kosovo’s internationally supervised independence may offer the best way-out of the crisis.” 
(Hungary Government, 2008).  In the same way, highlighting the need for international supervision 
in Kosovo,  Luxembourg suggest creating a civil mission: “this 1500-men-strong EU mission will 
have to count on the strong support and protection of the NATO” (the EU-28 Watch, 2008).  
Similarly, Italy highlights that the rapid recognition of Kosovo is a necessary choice not to 
leave “in a country that we do not recognize the 2 thousand 600 Italian soldiers engaged in KFOR 
nor the 200 civil servants we are going to send with the EU civil mission. In fact, the necessary 
political and diplomatic coverage to operate on the ground and interact with the Pristina authorities 
would be lacking” thus “supervised independence” is seen as leverage for Italy. Likewise, Iceland 
highlights her presence at the processes of “supervised independence” among other things 
outlining that “the Icelandic Civil Aviation Authority provides quality control and certification at 
the airport in Pristina” (Iceland Government, 2008). 
Thus, the importance of the “supervised independence,” which allows the participation of 
the international community in the development of Kosovo is apparent. One may assume, that 
referring to this conditions states intend to reassure themselves that the consequences of 
recognition are regulated by themselves.  
 
 
3.2.4. Accepted legal practices   
 
While the discussion on “self-determination” in the analysis of the statements has slightly 
touched upon the references to “accepted legal practices,” this part of the analysis refers only to 
the cases where the reference to some elements of international law lacked a clear context. The 
theoretical part has illustrated that international law does not suggest a unified approach towards 
the value of recognition in the making of state. The Declaratory vs. Constitutive debates offer 
conflicting views on this matter. Moreover, the international law, as illustrated in the theoretical 
part, does not regulate secession by specific provisions created for secession only. Thus, while the 
states would love to present their act of recognition to be in line with the “accepted legal practices,” 
it would be challenging to justify a state recognition by the general provisions of international law. 
However, this category has identified the few cases where there were references to international 
law and the 2010 ICJ advisory opinion as “accepted legal practices” for recognition. Overall eight 
states have echoed that their act is somehow justified by international law, without further 
elaborating on the specific provisions of international law.  
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The findings illustrate that some states consider the recognition of Kosovo to be in line 
with the international law. For example, the statement by Burkina Faso reads:  “Burkina Faso 
recognizes the existence of a new sovereign state, in keeping with international law” (b92, 2008). 
This argument is important as it is the only one found in the given statement.  Moreover, 
Lithuania’s statement explains that the Kosovo case “does not violate the international law 
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of states” (Lithuania Seimas, 2008). However, 
this argument is coupled with considerations of  “regional peace and stability” (Ibid). In the same 
spirit, Dominican Republic highlights that the decision to recognize Kosovo is by “international 
norms for recognition of states” ( Kosovo MFA, 2009). 
To continue, Kuwait and Oman also note that the decision to recognize Kosovo is in line 
with “accepted legal practices.” The statement of Kuwait informs that the government has waited 
for the verdict of the International Court of Justice (Kosovo MFA, 2011).  Similarly, Oman 
reminds of its awareness “of the ICJ decision related to the issue of Kosovo’s independence”  thus 
welcoming “the membership of Kosovo in the United Nations and other international and regional 
organizations” (Balkan Insight, 2011).  As discussed the ICJ did not entail that Kosovo’s 
independence is legal, it merely concluded that the Declaration of independence is not illegal.  
Finally, Portugals’ statement is important as it highlights “the fact that international law 
cannot solve a political problem” (Balkan Insight, 2008). This statement, unlike the previous ones, 
entails that the act of recognition is not a matter of legal analysis. Thus the clash on Declaratory 
vs. Constitutive theories is apparent in the given category: while the former statements try to bring 
their act of recognition closer to “accepted legal practices,” the latter attempts to limit the 
recognition to politics. 
Overall, the separate references to the “accepted legal practices,” while few, illustrate that 
the problem of state recognition is still unresolved in international law.  
 
3.2.5. Unique case 
 
When it comes to the “unique case” theme, seven states have echoed arguments in favor of 
the uniqueness of the Kosovo case in their statements. The „unique case“ type of arguments 
illustrate the eagerness of these states to prevent other secessionist entities to present the Kosovo 
case as precedent-setting. While some of these statements do not elaborate on what makes the 
Kosovo case unique others explain it in light of the “past events” that have surrounded the region. 
For example, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland state that the Kosovo case is unique and 
cannot be considered a precedent for solving other unresolved conflicts,  without clearly explaining 
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the source of the uniqueness (Hungary MFA, 2008; Latvia MFA, 2008; Lithuania Seimas, 2008; 
Poland MFA, 2008). Meanwhile,  the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of  Peru indicates that the unique 
situation derives from the “political evolution that led to the disintegration of the former 
Yugoslavia” (Andina, 2008). 
  Furthermore,  Canada and the US also explicitly state what makes the Kosovo case unique.  
In fact, Canada’s statement presents the most thorough discussion on the topic and combines the 
“unique case” argument with elements of “earned sovereignty” approach found in the Kosovo 
case. It states that Kosovo is a unique case, which is illustrated by ethnic cleansing, the role 
subsequently the UN-led “international supervision” and the “supervised independence.” which 
assumes the role of international organizations in facilitating Kosovo’s smooth transition to full 
independence (Balkan Insight, 2008). Moreover, in the statement, there is a special emphasis on 
that the Kosovo case and the case of Quebec are different (Ibid). This statement is interesting in a 
way that it presents the position and the justifications of a country, which while having a similar 
internal secessionist entity but chooses to recognize another secessionist entity. Here, Canada 
makes sure, to simultaneously invoke all the possible conditions for recognition found in the 
Kosovo case, thus narrowing the room for further negative consequences. Combining the elements 
of  “earned sovereignty” with the elements of  “remedial secession” to display the uniqueness of 
the Kosovo case Canada presents more conditions for recognition. Moreover, to make the 
argument of the uniqueness of the case stronger, it states that “many world and Kosovo leaders” 
have highlighted the same point. It seems that this sentence implies that while Kosovo is 
recognized, Quebec holds no chances for recognition, as no other entity would approve of that.  
Above all, the parallels between the statements of Canada and the US highlighting the same 
point are apparent. To illustrate, the statement of the US concludes that “the unusual combination 
of factors found in the Kosovo situation […] including the context of Yugoslavia's breakup, the 
history of ethnic cleansing and crimes against civilians in Kosovo, and the extended period of UN 
administration” make Kosovo a unique case (US Government, 2008).  It follows that both US and 
Canada explain thoroughly why the Kosovo case is unique, thus representing their anxiety over 
the emergence of using Kosovo case as precedence-setting, thus aiming to block this from 
happening in advance. 
Overall, while some states present their concerns about the future implications of 
recognition by conceptualizing the case as unique, it is the big powers that seem to be more 
concerned about this point.  
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3.2.6. Regional Peace and stability 
 
As discussed, the category “regional peace and stability” was generated in a data-driven 
way. Thus, it is an important addition to the research. Nevertheless, while the considerations for 
peace and stability are linked to Remedial Secession and Earned Sovereignty themes, from the 
discussions on the theoretical part, in fact, these schemes do not specify it as a valid element for 
secession. Above all, in the analyzed statements 31 states present their concern for regional peace 
and stability in different contexts. While some of the arguments outline that the Independence of 
Kosovo is vital for the stability of the region, others state that the act of recognition contributes to 
this stability.  
The statements of Canada, Australia, and the US highlight the importance of the regional 
peace and stability in different manners. For example, Australia calls on the leaders of Kosovo and 
Serbia to “settle their differences peacefully” (Australia MFA, 2008),  calling the Serbian 
Government to cooperate with European partners “in the interests of stability and economic 
development of the region as a whole” (Ibid). Meanwhile, Canada highlights the importance of  
“the development of Kosovo into a democratic, multi-ethnic state that fully respects human rights” 
for “peace, political stability and economic progress in the Balkans” (Balkan Insight, 2008). 
Finally, for the US Kosovo’s independence is the only viable option to promote stability in the 
region given the conflicts of the 1990s.  To achieve this stability the US invites Serbia to work 
together with the United States to achieve  “the protection of the rights, security, culture, and 
livelihood of the Serb community in Kosovo” (Ibid). 
 Thus, while Australia identifies the importance of the European partners, Canada, 
highlights the human rights and the US outlines the importance of he the US for achieving regional 
peace and stability Japan’s short statement also includes this argument., Japan expects that 
Kosovo's independence will contribute to the long-lasting stability of the region. Moreover, 
Japan’s short statement also includes this argument, outlining the expectation that “Kosovo's 
independence will contribute to the long-lasting stability of the region.” (Japan, MFA, 2008). 
To continue, several European states have also extensively referred to the argument of 
“regional peace and stability,”  entailing that it has affected the decision of recognition. For 
example, France evaluates the importance of Kosovo’s independence as contributing to the 
stability of the Western Balkans. Moreover, Italy’s Deputy Prime Minister of the time Massimo 
D’Alema underlines the importance of the Italian presence in the Balkans as a factor of balance 
and guarantee for all (Reuters 22200). Meanwhile, Germany insists that  “the rapid recognition of 
the Republic of Kosovo by as many states as possible is the only way to ensure lasting stability in 
the region” (German Government, 2008). The statement of Czech Republic presents the conviction 
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that the recognition of Kosovo independence will “reinforce stability in the region as a whole” 
(Radio Praha, 2008). Similarly, Austria’s statement highlights the importance of drawing a final 
decision for the development of the region stating that the  “the long-term stabilization of the 
Balkans and its integration in the European Union”  is a primary goal for the country(Austria MFA, 
2008).  
Other European states such as Switzerland, Luxembourg, Iceland also present interesting 
arguments. According to the given statement while for Switzerland the determination of the final 
status of Kosovo is a precondition for the stability and development of the whole Balkan region 
(Swissinfo, 2008) for Luxembourg it is the responsibility of Europe to prevent the possible 
destabilization (the EU-28 Watch, 2008). Moreover, in case of Iceland’s statement, the stress is on 
finding such a settlement on the future status of Kosovo “that all UN member states can live with” 
(Iceland MFA, 2008). 
Also, in their joint statement Hungary, Bulgaria and Croatia highlight their interest in 
securing maximum stability in South-eastern Europe in light of the European perspective of the 
Balkans (Croatia, MFA, 2008). Meanwhile, in a separate statement released by the Government 
of Hungary, the country emphasizes that the status settlement “was necessary for the lasting 
stability and development of the region” (Hungary MFA, 2008). Correspondingly, another joint 
statement highlighting such points comes from Montenegro and Macedonia. Overall, the 
document entails  the commitment of these countries  committed to “permanent stability, peace, 
security and progress of all the countries of the region, with clear European and Euro Atlantic 
perspective” (Montenegro Government, 2008) 
Moreover,  some other states from Africa and other parts of the world have also touched 
upon the issue of regional peace and stability in their statements. To illustrate, Senegal offers its 
support to all efforts aimed at maintaining peace, stability and good relations between the people 
and the states in the Balkan region” (HAABA, 2008). Likewise, the Government of Somalia hails 
Kosovo’s contribution to the stability and peaceful coexistence in the Balkans”. Meanwhile, 
Togo’s statement hails the independent as important for peace in the world (TOGO, 2014). Also, 
Samoa expressed hope that Kosovo’s independence would help to achieve “stability in the region” 
(Balkan Insight, 2008). Moreover, Antigua and Barbuda stress the importance of the negotiations 
between Serbia and Kosovo as a contribution  “to peace and stability in the region” (Kosova Live 
360, 2015). Meanwhile, Belize highlights this category in light of Kosovo’s commitment to the 
implementation of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles and rules of international 
law”( Balkan Insight, 2008).  
More than that, several Islamic states have also presented their concerns for peace and 
stability in their statements. For example, Egypt highlights that it is “in the framework of the 
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Permanent Arab Republic of Egypt's endeavor to establish international peace and security” in 
light of different provisions of international law (Egypt MFA, 2013). Saudi Arabia’s statement 
asserts some hopes that the recognition will “contribute to security, stability, and prosperity of 
Kosovo and neighboring countries” (b92, 2009).  
Finally,  one of the most interesting and thorough discussions of this category is found in 
Turkey’s statement, where securing peace and stability in the Balkans is presented as Turkeys' 
foreign policy priorities. Moreover, the statement highlights  Turkey’s attached importance to 
advance the understanding of lasting peace in the Balkans (Turkey MFA, 2008). Finally, Kosovo's 
independence is discussed as an “an opportunity for the enhancement of stability and confidence 
among the countries in the region” (Ibid). 
To conclude, the concerns over the regional peace and stability of the Balkans, Europe, and 
the world, in general, make up the basis of many states‘ decision to recognize Kosovo. Meanwhile, 
regional peace and stability are understood in different ways.  
 
 
3.2.7. EU/NATO Perspective 
 
The inquiry into the data has indicated that only the Western states have introduced 
considerations  on the “EU/NATO perspective” in their statements. Moreover, most of the 
arguments outlined under this theme highlight the importance of the recognition and the 
independence of Kosovo for the Balkans or Europe. Finally, some states do so considering the 
further relations with Serbia thus attempting to overcome the possible negative consequences of 
Kosovo’s international recognition.  
To start with, apart from considering the creation of Kosovo as a historical event, in the 
given statement Albania highlights the importance of this act for creating conditions for the 
development of the entire Kosovan society (Albania Government, 2008). Moreover, one of the 
conditions for this development is the perspective of Kosovo’s European and Euro-Atlantic 
integration. In the following sentences, Albania presents that after the Declaration of Independence 
Kosovo turns into an outstanding international actor “clearly Euro Atlantic-oriented” (Ibid). 
Finally, the statement highlights the importance of friendly relations with Serbia in the European 
perspective. Similarly, Germany expresses a wish that Serbia and the EU establish close ties as 
soon as possible (German Government, 2008). Likewise, Ireland expressed the importance of the 
European future for reconciling Serbia and Kosovo stating the hope that Serbia and Kosovo can 
get over their tragic past and move toward a brighter future together in Europe (Ireland MFA, 
2008). 
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To continue, the joint statement of Macedonia and Montenegro extensively discusses the 
importance of the EU/NATO factor for the common future of both Kosovo and Serbia 
(Montenegro Government, 2008). First, in the given statement the states underline the importance 
of the Ahtisaari plan as a  contribution to the new European and Euro Atlantic perspective of the 
region. Moreover, they underline their commitment to the general development of the region, with 
“clear European and Euro Atlantic perspective”(Ibid). Finally, they present their willingness to 
support the Republic of Serbia on its way to European integration” (Ibid).  
 Furthermore, the Czech Republic, in a similar manner presents that among other things, 
the recognition is based on the consideration that it will assist efforts of the Western Balkan 
countries to join European and Euro-Atlantic institutions (Praha Radio, 2008). Finally, giving 
credits the to the European future of the region, The Netherlands emphasizes the importance of 
good relations with the countries of the region, including Serbia. Moreover, the statement indicates 
the commitment of the Netherlands to continue to work with its partners of the EU and North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners to strengthen stability and promote the region’s 
integration into Euro-Atlantic structures (The Netherlands Government, 2008).  
Last but not least, similar points were echoed in the statements of Poland, Lithuania, and 
Portugal. According to Poland's Radosław Sikorski, the decision of the Polish government will 
facilitate  Serbia and Kosovo on their way to the European Union (EU) structures (Poland MFA, 
2008). Likewise, Portugal believes that recognition will foster the ties “within NATO and the EU 
and above all the Russian intervention in Georgia” (Balkan insight, 2008). Additionally, Lithuania 
takes note of Kosovo’s commitment “to comprehensively and efficiently support the European 
perspective to Western Balkan countries and the Republic of Serbia” (Lithuania Seimas, 2008). 
Finally, Luxembourg highlights that  The European perspective offered to Serbia will be directed 
to further enlargement of the EU in the Balkan region noting that the paramount goal should be 
the prevention of “terrible nationalism” (EU-28 Watch, 2008) 
Overall, the European states highlighting the importance of the “EU/NATO perspective”  
convinced that it is essential not only for the reconciliation of Kosovo and Serbia and the 
development of the whole Balkan region but also for the whole EU/NATO community given the 
challenges ahead.  
 
3.2.8. The position of other entities  
 
The analysis of the data has identified the “the position of other entities” in the statements 
of 17 states. The category illustrates that these states have tried to strengthen the validity of their 
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act of recognition implying that other “important” entities have also made a similar decision. This 
theme demonstrates the importance of the support of the great powers at least on the textual level.  
For example, the statement of France emphasizes the decision to recognize Kosovo to be 
in  “full agreement with this declaration of the European Union” (Le Figaro, 2008). Likewise, 
Italy’s statement indicates that decision to recognize Kosovo is in line with most of the European 
countries regarding this delicate and important problem” (Reuters, 208). San Marino also supports 
this point stating that the act of recognition is in line with the decisions of United Nations and 
European Union (RTV San Marino, 2008).  Comparably, Lichtenstein's recognition is an act which 
was focused on the actions of the EU, the UN, and Switzerland (Lichteinstein MFA, 2008). Also, 
Ireland highlights that most of their partners in the EU have recognized Kosovo (Ireland, MFA, 
2008).  
Other states such as Palau, Senegal, Japan, and South Korea also echo these points. 
Senegal’s recognition statement entails that the recognition is b”y the international and Islamic 
community” (HAABA, 2008). Moreover, Palau reminds that they recognize Kosovo, joining their 
“closest ally and partner, the United States of America” ( Kosovo MFA, 2012). Finally, statement 
of South Korea explicitly highlights that the fact that many of its allies “including the U.S., Japan, 
Australia, and European nations, as well as the United Nations, support Kosovo's independence” 
(Japan MFA, 2008) has influenced the decision to recognize Kosovo. 
To sum up, this theme underlines that while for some states the support of other entities of 
Kosovo’s Independence has influenced their decision to recognize Kosovo, others highlight this 
point neutrally.  
 
 
3.2.9.  Religious ties and Undefined 
 
 
Religious ties: When it comes to the category “Religious ties” it combines the statements that 
mentioned the importance of religion in the recognition statement. While few, these statements are 
worth attention.  For example, in the recognition statement, Libya emphasizes “the spirit of Islamic 
brotherhood between Libya and Kosovo” (Saudi Gazette, 2015). Meanwhile, Senegal states that 
the recognition was granted bearing in mind “the Islamic and International community” (HAABA, 
2008). Finally, a short statement from Saudi Arabia indicates that the decision to recognize Kosovo 
was made “bearing in mind religious and cultural ties with the people of Kosovo” (b92, 2009).  
Overall, these statements indicate that at least in case of the given countries even religion can be 
considered a part of the politics of recognition.  
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 Undefined: While referring to the theme named “undefined” it must be stated that while it does 
not provide much room for further interpretations, it still allows discussing some points about the 
politics of recognition.  
First of all, it is mostly the statements of the African states that provide no further 
information beyond presenting the fact of recognition and congratulating Kosovo on this occasion. 
It appears that for some states, for reasons beyond the discussion of this research, recognition is 
not an act worth elaborating on. In other words, the fact that either, the recognition and the 
arguments did not reach the broader audience, independent of the reasons, may reflect different 
considerations. To illustrate, while most of the Western states choose to justify their act of 
recognition substantially, the non-Western countries either do so superficially or skip this step at 
all. It follows that the recognition of Kosovo is more critical and problematic for the states who 
have to explain it more thoroughly.  Moreover, other states may choose to not elaborate on the act 
of recognition to avoid the responsibility of the consequences.  
Nevertheless, this gap illustrates that not only there is no obligation to recognize a newly 
emerged entity, but also there is no obligation to further elaborate on the act of recognition itself. 
This is the side-effect of the lack of a common framework for regulating the recognition acts. 
 
Overall, it can be stated that the themes identified by the analysis clearly reflect the emergence 
of the politics of recognition. The diversity of the arguments in line with the context of their 
application in the recognition statements show that each o these arguments facilitate to justify the 
recognition on the textual level. While the “Earned Sovereignty” scheme offered the opportunity 
of many “Regional Peace and stability” type of arguments were also prevalent in the recognition 
statements. Moreover, the interpretation of these findings also illustrated the way some arguments 
were instrumentalized for the recognition act.  
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Conclusion  
 
The aim of the thesis was to identify the politics of recognition in the case of the recognition 
of Kosovo through the systematic analysis of the arguments set out by the recognizing states in 
the recognition statements. In particular, the research question was  
 Based on the recognition statements, what arguments do the recognizing states use as tools 
for justifying the recognition of Kosovo? 
For the examination of the question, the thesis utilized the general framework of the politics 
of recognition which allowed the in-depth investigation of the area of state recognition.  In 
particular the discussion on the theories of state recognition in International law, the roots and the 
varying interpretations of the principle of self-determination coupled with the discussions on the 
different solutions offered by the schemes of “Remedial Secession” and “Earned Sovereignty” for 
regulating the secessionist conflicts helped to mark the gaps that allow the emergence of what 
different authors have referred to as the “politics of recognition”. 
First of all, it was identified that state recognition is a matter of great debates, first of all, within 
the legal discipline. The irreconcilable nature of the “Declaratory” and “Constitutive” debates in 
line with the lack of unified approach towards the definition of statehood are the primary reasons 
on why the international community has been unable to generate a common framework for 
generating the recognition acts which has allowed the emergence of the “politics of recognition  
Furthermore, the theory indicated the evolution of self-determination from a vague 
principle into a recognized right in international law. While a vague principle at the Wilsonian 
phase, self-determination was transformed into a right at the WWII period. Moreover, at the 
decolonization phase, it entailed the right of external self-determination for colonies later 
envisioning a right of internal self-determination for all peoples, to arguably allowing for the 
possibility of secession as a remedy of last resort. Not to mention, the most important observation 
here is that international law does not entail the absolute right to external self-determination i. e. 
secession to national groups outside the decolonization context. Meanwhile under a particular set 
of conditions such as the large-scale violations of human rights the doctrine of Remedial Secession 
envisions the possibility of secession under strict conditions.  However, it was also indicated that 
the foundations of the doctrine remain controversial both in theory and in practice.  
Finally, the last scheme covered by the theoretical framework of the politics of recognition 
was Earned Sovereignty. Overall, the discussion on the scheme identified that it was created as a 
serious attempt to regulate the development of Kosovo through the application of democratic peace 
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framework. The discussions on the theoretical framework ended by a general overview of the 
recognition of Kosovo, which identified that certain aspects of it are not well-explored.  
To continue, having set the theoretical basis for exploring the politics of recognition in the 
Kosovo case, the thesis applied the Qualitative Content Analysis method for analzing the 
recognition statements.  This method allowed identifying the main themes found in the recognition 
statements. What is more, the initial stage of the analysis of generating the coding frame indicated 
the politics of recognition i. e. the diverse reactions and the arguments found in the 
recognitionstatements. In line with the concept-driven categories the emergence of the data-driven 
categories clearly indicated where the theory must be refined.  
To be more precise, the analysis identified the importance of the elements of “Earned 
Sovereignty” for the politics of recognition of Kosovo as reflected in around 36 recognition 
statements. In particular, Kosovo’s commitment to democratization which was labeled as 
“conditional sovereignty” was highlighted by most of the states. Moreover, the importance of the 
“Ahtisaari plan” and „supervised independence“ was also apparent within the category of “Earned 
Sovereignty.” Nonetheless, it was indicated that the „accepted legal practices“ without  a clear 
context of  „Self-determinatin“ or „remedial secession“, etc. provide very weak grounds for 
justifying the recognition. Likewise, while some states refer to „religious ties“, the insignificance 
of this category was also evident.  
Furthermore, the analysis identified “Regional peace and stability” as the second most 
discussed theme found in the recognition statements.  The importance of the theme was apparent 
not only considering the number of the recognition statements referring to it, but also the fact that 
it was generated in a data-driven way. The same applies to the categories  “EU/NATO perspective” 
and the “Position of other entities.” That said, given the data-driven themes it can be stated that 
while theorising the politics of recognition it is important to also discuss these themes. 
Moreover, another observation refers to the themes “Remedial Secession” and “Popular 
Sovereignty.”  While the theory indicated that “self-determination” does not provide the best tool 
of argumentation for recognition statements, the analysis identified that nine states had used this 
argument explicitly.  By contrast, while the elements of “Remedial secession” were evident in the 
Kosovo case and the scheme itself arguably allowed more room for justifying the recognition of 
Kosovo, as opposed to the general right to “self-determination,” only ten states highlighted it in 
their statements.  
Also, the analysis illustrated that the justifications of Kosovo’s recognition, differed not 
only from state to state but also within the statements of each state. Moreover, many states coupled 
their arguments instead of presenting only one argument. What is more, while some states gave 
the whole picture of the arguments stating the direct or indirect influence on the decision of 
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recognition, others preferred not to bring any justifications at all. Notwithstanding, while some of 
the arguments within the themes were instrumentalized to justify the act of recognition explicitly, 
others were there to support the point implicitly, without inferring any link between recognition 
and the given argument.  
To continue the the analysis indicated  that it is mostly the European states that valued the 
“EU/NATO perspective”, also, they mostly did so in light of the considerations of “Regional Peace 
and stability.” In line with this, the „EU/NATO perspective“ is presented as a way for reconciling 
the Kosovo-Serbia interests in the future.  Moreover, in the European /Western states provided 
more arguments compared to the statements of states from other regions. In contrast, most of the 
statements categorised as “Undefined,” were from the non-Western states, in particular, many of 
the African states provided no arguments for the justifications regarding the recognition of 
Kosovo. 
Apart from what was discussed above, the interpretation of the findings also provided some 
important  points for the politics of reconition. For example, while discussing the “self-
determination” arguments, it was illustrated the way some statements misinterpreted the provisions 
of international law on self-determination instrumentalising it for justifying the recognition.    
Moreover, the choice of the states to couple their arguments identified that as long as there 
are no rules regulating the act of recognition, each state is going to presnt her own set of arguments 
and justifications given the circumstances and the political considerations.  
Meanwhile, while these states have different views on what may justify the act of 
recognition, most of them underline the further implications of this act for the “regional peace and 
stability.” In other words, it implies that while many conditions offer a substantial ground for 
independence, it is the considerations for peace and stability that drives the states to recognize 
Kosovo. Furthermore, choosing not to justify the recognition many states offer that after all, that 
recognition is a matter of politics and internal decisions rather than of International Law. When it 
comes to international law as a separate category, it was identified that only very few states choose 
to refer to it generally without any context of provisions. This indicates that states find it hard to 
explicitly state that international law supports the act o recognition, or as the statement of Portugal 
entailed, try to leave recognition to politics, arguing that International law cannot solve such 
problems.  
Finally, the fact that some statements are undefined, or do not provide any relevant 
arguments for this research, illustrates that not only there is no obligation to recognize a newly 
emerged entity, but also there is no obligation to further elaborate on the act of recognition itself. 
This naturally is a side-effect that comes with the fact that no framework regulates the act of 
recognition.  
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Finally, even though the politics of recognition foresees the differing and even 
contradicting reactions of the third states to the recognition of Kosovo, there are some patterns of 
argumentations as identified by the analysis of the empirical data. While some of the elements of 
these arguments are well placed within the general theoretical frame of the politics of recognition, 
in particular, within the scope of “Self-Determination,” “Remedia Secession,” ‘Earned 
Sovereignty” schemes, there are also themes not covered by the politics of recognition directly the 
importance of which was identified by the analysis of the recognition statements. It follows, that 
the further discussions on the recognition of Kosovo must consider the power of thes themes such 
as “Regional peace and stability,” “EU/NATO perspective,” “The position of other entities” etc. 
for justifying the act of recognition at least on the textual level. Notwithstanding that these are 
after all tools of justifications and do not explain the actual motives behind the recognition of 
Kosovo itself.  
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Appendix 1: Coding frame 
 
Category Code label Description of code Example of coded 
segment 
No of  
code 
No. of 
category 
Popular 
sovereignt
y 
Self-Determination A theme which highlights šelf-
determination explicitly 
FSM Recognizes 
Kosovo Act of Self-
Determination 
8 17 
The will of the 
people 
Where the statements highlight 
the independence or 
recognition in light of the will 
of the people of Kosovo 
Australia respects the 
decision of the 
people of Kosovo 
9 
Remedial 
Secession 
Violation of human 
rights 
Theme indicating the 
arguments regarding the 
violations of human rights of 
Kosovo Albanians in the past 
It is “understandable” 
that Kosovo’s 
authorities, led by 
Prime Minister 
Hashim Thaci, would 
decide to part ways 
with Serbia, due to 
“the crimes against 
humanity” 
perpetrated by then-
President Slobodan 
Milosevic’s regime. 
4 10 
No alternative Theme applied where 
independence or recognition is 
presented as a solution/ best 
alternative to the 
stalemate/status quo 
In light of the 
conflicts of the 
1990s, independence 
is the only viable 
option to promote 
stability in the 
region. 
8 
Earned 
sovereignt
y 
Exhaustion of 
negotiations 
Theme outlining the 
arguments which emphasized 
that the negotiations on the 
status of Kosovo were 
exhausted 
It has also become 
evident that there 
was no optimal 
solution acceptable to 
both sides, and the 
potential for further 
negotiations had been 
exhausted.  
8 36 
Ahtisaari plan References to the 
implementation, the elements 
or the general content of the 
Ahtisaari plan 
The new Kosovo is 
committed to 
implementing the 
Ahtisaari Plan and 
has accepted that the 
international 
community will 
monitor the 
15 
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implementation of 
the Plan.  
Elements of the 
Declaration of 
independence 
References to the 2008 
Declaration of independence 
of Kosovo’s Assembly 
The Republic of 
Turkey has 
welcomed the 
content and elements 
of the Declaration of 
Independence, and 
with this 
understanding, has 
decided to recognize 
the independence of 
the Republic of 
Kosovo.  
5 
Conditional 
Sovereignty 
Theme combining the 
references highlighting the 
importance of   Kosovo’s  
willingness to uphold to 
certain conditions outlined by 
the „standards before status“ 
plan and the positive attitude 
to democratic principles. 
Finland also 
emphasized respect 
for democracy, the 
rule of law, human 
rights, and the rights 
of all of Kosovo’s 
communities, as well 
as the importance of 
good relations with 
neighboring 
countries.  
 
 
27 
International 
supervision 
Theme applied when indicated 
references to the period of 
International Supervision of 
Kosovo since 1999 including 
„shared sovereignty“ and 
„institution building.“ 
The Prime Minister 
said that the 
government had been 
guided by the fact 
that Kosovo had been 
under UN control 
since 1999. 
4 
Supervised 
Independence 
Theme indicating arguments 
stating that Kosovo should be 
or already is willing to accept 
the active  presence of the 
international actors in the life 
of Kosovo after the 
independence.  
He said the 
government 
welcomed a 
commitment by the 
authorities in Kosovo 
to protect ethnic 
minorities and accept 
the presence of 
international civilian 
and military forces in 
the region.  
17 
Accepted 
Legal 
practices 
Accepted Legal 
practices 
References to accepted legal 
practices such s the decision of 
ICJ or International law 
outside the context of other 
legal schemes.  
The Government of 
the Dominican 
Republic, on the 
bases of its 
constitutional 
authority and in 
accordance with its 
 8 
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practices and 
international norms 
for recognition of 
states has agreed to 
recognize the 
Independent 
Republic of Kosovo. 
Regional 
peace and 
stability 
Regional peace and 
stability 
Theme underlining the 
arguments stating that 
Kosovo’s independence or its 
recognition is important in 
light of the considerations of 
regional peace and stability/  
willingness to support regional 
peace and stability 
The development of 
Kosovo into a 
democratic, multi-
ethnic state that fully 
respects human rights 
is essential for peace, 
political stability and 
economic progress in 
the Balkans. 
 31 
EU/NATO 
perspectiv
e 
EU/NATO 
perspective 
Parts of the statements 
highlighting the European or 
the Transatlantic future of the 
region 
Recognition is 
important to foster 
the ties within NATO 
and the EU and 
above all the Russian 
intervention in  
 
Georgia 
 15 
The 
position of 
other 
entities 
The position of other 
entities 
Theme  indicating the 
arguments explicitly or 
implicitly highlighting that the 
act of recognition is  in line 
with the position of other 
powers 
Recognising the 
independence of 
Kosovo, the 
government 
expressed its 
solidarity with other 
states of the EU and 
with the international 
community. 
 17 
Unique 
case 
Unique case Theme identifying the 
arguments for the unique/sui 
generis nature of the Kosovo 
case 
At the same time, the 
Government 
reaffirmed that 
resolving the status 
of Kosovo constitutes 
a sui generis case that 
does not set any 
precedent for other 
unresolved conflicts. 
 7 
Religious 
Ties 
Religious Ties Theme highlighting references 
to religious ties  
A short statement 
from the ministry on 
Monday said that the 
decision came 
"bearing in mind 
religious and cultural 
ties with the people 
 3 
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of Kosovo, and 
respecting their wish 
for independence." 
Undefined 
 
 
 
Undefined 
 
Recognition statements that do 
not present further details apart 
from the fact of recognition 
  19 
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